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This thesis empirically examines capital management mechanisms of the U.S. 
banks under the Basel capital adequacy accord.  An important finding is that Tier I 
capital (primary capital under the regulatory regime prior to the Basel accord) and 
Tier II capital management incentives and their associated manipulation mechanisms 
are significantly different. Banks are likely to decrease (instead of increasing) loan 
loss provisions for Tier I capital management. In contrast, banks increase loan loss 
provisions for Tier II capital management. This dichotomy in capital management via 
loan loss provisions is completely missed out in prior literature. The conflicting 
effects of loan loss provisions on Tier II capital and earnings are also studied. Results 
suggest that, among banks with the same level of Tier II capitals, banks would prefer 
to decrease loan loss provisions for earnings management purpose if there is an 
earnings decrease from the previous year. 
This study further examines cross-sectional variations of identified capital 
management mechanisms across banks with three different firm-specific 
characteristics - nonaudit service fee ratios, variability of the ratios, and bank size. 
Consistent with evidences from non-banking industries, high level of nonaudit service 
fees strengthens the association between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions. 
In other words, banks purchased substantial amount of nonaudit services are likely to 
engage in capital manipulations. Another appealing finding is that, in contrast to the 
“economic bond” theory, consistent and regular purchases of nonaudit services (low 
variability) suppress manipulation actions. Lastly, capital management prevails in 
small banks. These findings not only enrich capital management literature, but also 
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Although capital management has been extensively documented in prior 
research, there is no direct evidence of bank managers’ adjustment to the regulatory 
capital requirement changes in the Basel Accord. Past papers either focus on banks’ 
discretionary behaviors on primary capital prior to the Basel Accord (Greenawalt and 
Sinkey, 1988; Moyer, 1990; Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1990; Wahlen, 1994; 
Wetmore and Brick, 1994; Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995), or focus on the 
marginal transition effect of different capital regulations before and after the 
implementation of the Basel Accord (Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed, Takeda, and 
Thomas, 1999). This thesis directly examines the U.S. banks’ capital management 
mechanisms associated with both types of regulatory capital - Tier I capital and Tier II 
capital under the Basel Accord regime. I also extend prior research by investigating 
cross-sectional variations of capital management mechanisms, aiming to identify the 
impact of some firm-specific characteristics on capital management incentives.  
Capital management mechanisms via loan loss provisions have been 
significantly changed since the Basel Accord in 19911. Prior to that, banks must have 
primary capital ratio exceeding 5.5% to be adequately capitalized. Because the net 
effect of loan loss provisions on primary capital is the tax shield of loan loss 
provisions, banks with low primary capital are likely to manipulate regulatory capital 
upward via increasing loan loss provisions. This positive impact of loan loss 
                                                 
1 The capital-raising target could also be reached via security gains and losses, loan charge-offs, capital 
notes, common stock, preferred stock, and dividends. 
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provisions on primary capital is supported by empirical literature evidence. Kim and 
Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al. (1999) both show that the relation between loan loss 
provisions and primary capital are negative. Similar studies include Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988), Moyer (1999), Whalen (1990) and Beatty et al. (1995). In 1991, the 
U.S. banks adopted a new capital system called the Basel Capital Accord, aiming to 
assess bank capital in relation to the underlying risks that a bank is actually facing. 
This new capital requirement system significantly changed the composition and 
computation of regulatory capital. Tier I capital (mainly equity capital and published 
reserves from post-tax retained earnings) replaces the primary capital. And more 
importantly, loan loss reserves, the mechanical link between regulatory capital and 
loan loss provisions, are no longer included in Tier I capital.  Additionally, Tier II 
capital is introduced as a new regulatory capital component. In contrast to Tier I 
capital, loan loss reserves are allowed to be incorporated in Tier II capital with an 
upper limit of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Moreover, under the Basel Accord the 
minimum adequacy requirements of being “adequately-capitalized” are Tier I capital 
ratio of at least 4% and total capital ratio of at least 8%. These changes substantially 
alter the relationship between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions, leading to 
new predictions of bank managers’ capital manipulation mechanisms. 
Using a sample of 1,609 annual observations of bank holding firms that file Y-9C 
reports with the Federal Reserve from 2000 to 2005, I identify and explain four 
important capital management mechanisms in response to the new capital 
requirements under the Basel Accord. Firstly, I find a positive association between 
Tier I capital and loan loss provisions. Bank managers are likely to reduce loan loss 
provisions (instead of increasing loan loss provisions as they did before the Basel 
Accord) to preserve Tier I capital. This finding is different from Moyer (1990) and 
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Beatty et al. (1995) which document a negative relationship between primary capital 
and loan loss provisions. However, it is indirectly supported by Kim and Kross (1998) 
and Ahemad et al. (1999). Although they still document that loan loss provisions are 
negatively related to regulatory capital, the relationship has become less negative 
between loan loss provisions and Tier I capital since 1991. Secondly, in contrast to 
Tier I capital manipulation mechanism, banks would increase loan loss provisions in 
order to push up Tier II capital. Thirdly, this Tier II capital management incentive is 
particularly strong when the ratio of loan loss reserves to risk-weighted assets is low. 
Lastly, the conflicting incentives between Tier II capital and earnings are also 
investigated. Among banks with same level of Tier II capital, banks with earnings 
decrease from the previous year would prefer to manage earnings by decreasing loan 
loss provisions.  
Besides investigating new capital management mechanisms under the Basel 
Accord, this thesis also examines their cross-sectional variations as a function of three 
firm-specific factors – bank size, the nonaudit fee level and its variability. The three 
factors have significant impact on bank managers’ capital management incentives. 
The associations between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions are expected to 
be different across banks of different size. Some prior researches show that big firms 
are more likely to engage in managerial manipulations (Bishop, 1996; Rangan, 1998; 
Myers and Skinner, 2000; Barton and Simko, 2002).  On the other hand, current 
literature has opposing views on manipulation incentives of small firms. Small firms 
generally have higher manipulation demand to achieve smooth performance. Thus it 
is important to investigate the size effect on banks’ capital manipulation incentives 
under the Basel Accord.  
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The study of the impact of nonaudit service fees on banks’ capital management 
incentives is motivated by the fact that nonaudit service purchases prevail in the same 
period as the implementation of the Basel Accord. High level of nonaudit services is 
generally found to have adverse effects on financial quality in many industries. 
However, the impacts of nonaudit services have not been empirically examined in 
banks before. Besides that, I observe that both the frequency and magnitude of 
nonaudit service purchase vary vastly across different companies in recent years. I 
expect that banks who have consumed nonaudit services regularly and consistently 
over years are highly likely to have different capital manipulation incentives from 
those who only purchase nonaudit service sparsely. Therefore I study the impact of 
variability of nonaudit service fee ratios in addition to the level of nonaudit service fee 
ratios. 
This thesis shows very interesting and meaning results on the cross-sectionals 
variations of capital managements associated with the three factors. With respect to 
size, capital manipulations prevail in small banks in comparison with their large 
counterparts. With respect to the nonaudit service fee level, I find that banks with high 
level of nonaudit service fee ratios have stronger association between regulatory 
capitals and discretionary loan loss provisions. Consistent with evidence from non-
banking industries, nonaudit services purchased from an incumbent auditor increase 
auditors’ acquiescence to client pressure. As a consequence, banks with high level of 
nonaudit service fee ratios are more likely to engage in capital manipulation actions. 
Surprisingly, contradictory to the prevailing “economic bond” theory, I find that 
regular and consistent nonaudit service purchases (low variability) suppress bank 
managers’ capital managerial incentives. This could be explained by higher litigation 
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cost and detection risk induced by the stringent regulatory interventions on nonaduit 
services since 2000.  
This paper contributes to studies on capital management and loan loss provisions 
in several ways. First, my results have important regulatory implications. It uncovers 
a complete series of capital management mechanisms related to the Basel Accord 
regulation. These findings provide us a clear picture of how bank managers react to 
the capital regulations under the Basel Accord, and how they change their capital 
strategies dynamically across different banks. I identify and explain the positive 
association between Tier I capital and loan loss provisions. This paper is the first one 
in literature to directly investigate Tier I capital manipulation with a sample period 
completely within the Basel Accord regime. Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al. 
(1999) examine the Tier I capital, with the primary focus on the transitional effect of 
capital regulatory changes. Although they show some under-provisioning of loan loss 
provisions in the new Basel regime comparing to periods before 1991, the relationship 
between loan loss provisions and Tier I capital in these two papers are negative. To 
extend the research scope of prior related studies, for the first time in literature I also 
examine the differences of the relation between loan loss provisions and regulatory 
capital across banks with different firm-specific characteristics. My results provide 
important reference to help governance practitioners and academics to develop a more 
circumspect regulatory approach to detect manipulative actions, and to take 
appropriate punishment which fit “the crime” identified in this study. 
Second, this paper suggests researchers to take Tier II capital into consideration in 
future capital management studies. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to identify 
features of Tier II capital and its associated capital management mechanism. My 
results show that, Tier II capital can substantially influence banks managerial 
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decisions, and its manipulation mechanism and implications are totally different from 
those of Tier I capital. However, the dichotomy of Tier I and Tier II capital are missed 
out in prior researches.  Past studies examine either primary capital (Moyer, 1990; 
Beatty et al., 1995) or Tier I capital (Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed et al., 1999) only. 
This study reminds researchers to also consider Tier II capital in their future studies in 
order to have a complete understanding of banks’ managerial incentives and actions. I 
also study the conflicting effect between earnings management incentive and Tier II 
capital incentive in this paper. 
Third, I utilize a series of six loan portfolios to construct more powerful capital 
management tests. Besides the non-performing loan, total assets and loan loss 
reserves which are included in prior literature, I add another six categories of loans as 
additional determinants of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions: loans secured by real 
estate, loans to commercial and industries, loans to depository institutions, loans to 
agricultural production, loans to individuals and loans to foreign government. Power 
of the tests are enhances by better isolating the discretionary portion of loan loss 
provisions from the nondiscretionary portion. My results show, loans secured by real 
estate, loans to commercial and industries and loans to individuals have significant 
explanatory power to loan loss provisions. My findings suggest that, in order to 
minimize the measurement errors and misspecification problems caused by missing 
variables, researchers should take the three additional determinants into consideration 
in their tests of capital management via loan loss provisions. 
This study provides further implications on nonaudit service research. It provides 
the first banking-industry-specific evidence on the nonaudit service research area. It is 
an appealing contribution to the literature. Nonaudit service is widely studied as an 
important economic determinant of earnings management incentive. However, it has 
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not been incorporated in capital research before. To my knowledge this is the first 
paper to examine nonaudit service fees in the banking industry. I purposely choose to 
study this research topic in banking context because banking industry provides a 
better experimental environment by providing a more powerful proxy for 
discretionary behaviors. Kinney and Libby (2002) review the nonaudit service related 
literature and attempt to explain the inconsistency of literature results. They suggest 
that one important way to increase the power of nonaudit service research models is to 
find a reliably proxy for the real financial reporting quality which can reliably 
distinguish its discretionary portion from its nondiscretionary portion. Loan loss 
provisions in banking industry satisfy two key criteria of a good manipulation 
detection variable they mentioned. Loan loss provisions are very sensitive to 
hypothesized management behaviors. Furthermore, the nondiscretionary components 
of loan loss provisions can be fairly reliably developed based on the generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which makes loan loss provision a much 
better manipulation detection proxy than those other indicators used in the literature. 
Comparing to other literature studies, the nonaudit service tests designed in this 
specific banking industry study have relatively high test power and reliability.   
Lastly, this study promotes a new and important proxy - the variability of nonaudit 
fee ratios as a new measure of the tightness of economic bond between auditors and 
auditees. This is the first paper to research nonaudit services from the perspective of 
its purchase frequency in a time-series manner, instead of the purchase quantity only. 
One interesting finding is that the impact of nonaudit service purchase frequency on 
capital management incentives is largely different from the quantity effect 
documented in prior related researches. This new measure provides us a different 
research angle to study auditor independence and nonaudit services in future.  
  8
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews literature 
studies on capital management and nonaduit services, which lead to the hypotheses 
development in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the research design. Sample data 
selecting process and descriptive statistics are also included in chapter 4. Chapter 5 
presents the main results and discussions, followed by sensitivity analysis in chapter 6. 















































This chapter starts with a general introduction on the association between capital 
management and regulatory capital requirements in section 2.1. Section 2.2 explains 
the rationale of choosing the loan loss provision account as a capital management tool 
and the associated capital management mechanism. The applicability of capital 
management under the Basel Accord regime (even the Basel II regime) is 
demonstrated in section 2.3, followed by the literature review of nonaudit service 
research in section 2.4.   
 
2.1. Capital management and regulatory requirements 
Bank capital management results from the conflicts between exogenous cost of 
capital and regulatory capital requirement. In the absence of managerial 
manipulations, bank’s capital management by nature is a process aiming to make sure 
that a bank holds enough capital which can adequately account for the risk of 
unexpected loss. However, because there is an exogenous cost of bank capital, a bank 
may tend to hold less capital than the socially optimal level relative to its credit 
exposure, and over-invests its capital in high-risk projects to achieve higher capital 
returns and maximize its shareholders’ value. This moral hazard problem is 
theoretically supported by option-pricing models in literature. Merton (1977) shows 
the option value of deposit insurance increases as leverage or asset risk increases. An 
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unregulated bank would take excessive leverage risks at the expense of the deposit 
insurance (Benston, Eisenbeis, Kane and Kaufman, 1986; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; 
Keeley and Furlong, 1990). In order to reduce the put option value of deposit 
insurance and ensure banks absorb a reasonable level of losses before they become 
insolvent, government institutions set a regulatory capital framework on how banks 
and depository institutions must handle their capital. Adequacy of regulatory capital is 
measured by capital adequacy ratios. The capital adequacy ratio is the ratio of a 
bank’s regulatory capital to its highly standardized assets (see Illustration 2.1 for 
further explanation).  In order to protect depositors, a bank must have its capital 
adequacy ratios exceed certain minimum level. In the event of winding-up, depositors 
would not lose money as long as a bank’s loss is smaller than the amount of capital it 
has. The higher the capital adequacy ratio, the higher level of protection depositors 
can have. 
<– Insert Illustration 2.1 around here –> 
Capital adequacy framework has been changed over years. Prior to year 1988, all 
G-10 nations2 had their own regulatory policies and capital rules to regulate banks and 
depository institutions. Within that regime, capital adequacy ratios include both 
primary ratio and total capital ratio. Primary capital consists of two key categories of 
elements - equity capital and disclosed reserves. Specifically, it includes common 
stocks, retained earnings, loan loss reserves, perpetual preference shares and 
mandatory convertible debt. Primary capital is readily available in the published 
accounts and is used by banking systems of all G-10 countries to measure capital 
adequacy. As a critical indicator of profit margins and capacity to compete, it reflects 
                                                 
2 Group of Ten (G-10) refers to the group of countries that have agreed to participate in the General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB).It includes Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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both the quality and level of capital resources maintained by a bank. Total capital is 
the sum of primary capital and supplementary capital. Supplementary capital largely 
consists of reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments and subordinate term debt. 
Although each nation normally has a very slightly different way of regulatory capital 
calculation, the minimum level of capital adequacy requirement is quite similar. To be 
adequately capitalized, a bank holding company must have its primary capital ratio in 
excess of 5.5% and total capital ratio over 6% of its standardized total assets. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced a new capital 
measurement system for the international convergence on capital measures and capital 
standards in 1988, which is commonly known as the Basel Capital Accord (hereafter, 
the Basel Accord). The United States started to implement the Basel Accord through 
issuance of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 19913 . This 
new capital system seeks to improve existing rules by aligning regulatory capital 
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. It also incorporates 
assets risk weights and off-balance activities into consideration4. More importantly, it 
changes the composition and computation of regulatory capital. Prior to the 
implementation of the Basel Accord, total capital was the sum of primary capital and 
secondary capital. Under the Basel Accord, it is the summation of Tier I capital and 
Tier II capital. Tier I capital and Tier II capital are technically and conceptually 
different from primary capital and supplementary capital. Tier I capital represents 
shareholders' funds in a bank, i.e. share of the bank’s assets after all debts repaid to 
                                                 
3 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 started the implementation of new 
capital adequacy framework in 1991,and 1990 is a transitional year, banks in U.S can choose to 
conform to the old system or to the new one. 
4 1988 Basel Accord is mainly designed to assessing capital in relation to credit risk. Supervision 
institutions are trying to deal with other risks, for example, interest rate risk, operation risk and 
investment risk in further development of Basel Accord. Furthermore, the relative strength of capital 
also depends on the quality of a bank’s assets and off-balance sheet exposure. Therefore, risk-weighted 
assets are designed to be in the denominator of capital ratios. In order to be simple and easy to 
implement, the framework of weights are designed in a broad-brush basis, only five weights are used, 0, 
10, 20, 50 and 100%. 
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the creditors. It includes shareholder’s equity, non-cumulative perpetual preference 
stock and minority interests. Tier I capital is different from primary capital, as loan 
loss reserves are removed from Tier I capital. Instead, loan loss reserves have been 
included as important components in Tier II capital. Tier II capital includes loan loss 
reserves (up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets), preference shares, hybrid capital 
instrument, subordinate term debt and perpetual debt. In the new regime, the 
minimum capital requirements are also different. Banks should maintain Tier I capital 
ratio to be at least 4% and total capital ratio to be at least 8% to be “adequately 
capitalized”.  
No matter it is in the old regime or under the Basel Accord, high costs of violating 
capital adequacy requirements give bank managers strong incentives for capital 
manipulation. The regulatory capital requirements within both of the pre- and post- 
Basel regime constrain banks’ investment opportunities. Banks’ expected return is 
diminished because of the forced reduction in leverage. How do banks respond to the 
capital requirements? Are the penalties for falling below the regulatory guidelines 
large enough to induce banks to deliberately raise their capital? The answer is yes. 
Cost of falling short of regulatory threshold is indeed, very considerable. Moyer (1990) 
pointed out that “because regulators are empowered to restrict bank operations, a bank 
with capital that regulators consider to be inadequate incurs greater regulatory costs 
than a bank with adequate capital”. Specifically, the regulatory costs include sanctions, 
termination of federal insurance or stringent restrictions on additional loan deposits 
and investments. These tremendous costs of capital inadequacy give bank managers 
high incentive to deliberately manipulate capital upward for the purpose of being 
“adequately capitalized” or “well-capitalized”, especially when capital ratios fall short 
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of target level (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed et al., 
1999).  
2.2. Capital management via loan loss provisions 
Capital management targets can be achieved via excising discretion on different 
accounting accounts, for example, loan write-offs, security gains, loan loss provisions 
and equity. Among those, loan loss provision account is the most popular capital 
management tool identified in literature. Moyer (1990) and Scholes, Wilson, and 
Wolfson (1990) examine the capital management via loan loss provisions and other 
tools. They found out that banks with capital levels close to violating minimum 
capital requirement inflate capital via loan loss provisions. They did not find 
significant association between capital levels and any other tool. Similarly, Wahlen 
(1994), Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty et al. (1995), Kim and Kross (1998), and 
Ahmed et al. (1999) document banks’ capital managerial discretions by using loan 
loss provisions. Loan loss provisions5 are estimations of expected losses on a portfolio 
of impaired loans. They constitute a contra-account to reduce the gross loan value in 
the balance sheet and an expense account to lower net earnings after tax in the income 
statement. Basically, the loan loss provision account has three distinguished features 
which make it a popular capital management tool. 
First, comparing to other capital management tools, loan loss provisions have the 
most substantial impact on regulatory capital. As illustrated by Beatty (1995), both the 
mean (8.26 %) and median (5.99 %) of the ratio of loan loss provisions to primary 
capital are the highest comparing to all other capital management tools tested in that 
paper. This is not surprising. Loan portfolios are the most important assets in banking 
industry which are typically 10-15 times larger than equity, and loan loss provisions 
                                                 
5 Loan loss provisions are also referred to as ‘loan-loss allowance’  
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are by nature non-cash expenses set aside as allowance for all bad loans. Equity is 
also an important portion of primary capital, however, it is not as well-accepted as 
loan loss provisions as a capital management tool. Its adjustment is difficult and 
costly. First of all, shareholders may be reluctant to contribute new capital to banks 
when they are undercapitalized, as most of the benefits would accrue to creditors. 
Moreover, new equity issuing of undercapitalized banks conveys negative information 
to the market investors on the banks’ economic value. 
Second, bank loan loss provisions are highly sensitive to capital management 
incentives. Loan loss provisions are closely related to regulatory capital through loan 
loss reserves6 (contra-asset account). Every one dollar increase of loan loss provisions 
technically increases loan loss reserves by the same magnitude. In both regimes 
before and after the Basel Accord implementation, loan loss reserves are always 
included in regulatory capital. Prior to 1988, loan loss reserves were substantial 
components of primary capital. Under the Basel framework, loan loss reserves are still 
qualified to be included in Tier II capital with an upper limit of 1.25% of risk-
weighted total assets. Thus, loan loss provisions can changes regulatory capital 
accordingly through their impact on loan loss reserves (see Illustration 2.2 for further 
explanation). 
<– Insert Illustration 2.2 around here –> 
Third, loan loss provisions are not only sensitive to regulatory capital, they are 
also highly manageable with a reasonably low detection risk. Guided by SFAS No.5, 
bank managers can execute judgment in timing and quantifying loan loss provisions. 
There are two phases in loan loss provisioning. Bank managers’ first challenge is to 
segment the loan portfolio into different loan categories with similar characteristics. 
                                                 
6 Loan loss provisions are related to loan loss reserves, TTTT LWOLLPLLPLLR −+= −1 , one unit 
increase of loan loss provisions increase loan loss reserves by one unit .  
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Then they have to estimate the loan loss and to determine the correspondent loan loss 
provision within each loan category. Bank managers’ judgments and discretion are 
necessary in estimating loan loss provisions in each of the two phases. For example, 
in the first phrase, they can classify loans as past due relatively sooner right after the 
borrower misses a payment, or they can take longer time to revise the loan 
classification. They can also over-or under-estimate loan loss provisions within each 
loan category at their discretion in the second phrase of loan loss provisioning. 
Because bank managers have the private information of the loan quality, their 
judgments can not be easily changed or replaced (Wahlen, 1994; Dermine and Neto 
de Carvalho, 2004). 
Loan classification system is generally used to guide the loan loss provisioning in 
the first phase. However, the real loan classification process itself is often a matter of 
judgment. Within the Five-grade loan classification system in the U.S, loans and 
advances are classified into 5 categories: Standard loans, Specially Mentioned loans, 
Substandard loans, Doubtful loans, and Loss loans (Russell Krueger, 2002) (see Table 
2.1 for further explanation). In general, the loan classification decision is made based 
on assessments of a number of factors. Degree of loan collectability, borrowers’ 
repayment ability and collateral value are the mostly frequently used indicators (Bank 
of International Settlements, 2006) 7 . However, the measurements of these three 
factors, by nature, are largely judgmental. Generally collectibility is measured by the 
length of period that the loan interest and principal are overdue, but managers can also 
choose to consider some unascertainable forward-looking loan features for 
                                                 
7  There are some environmental factors bank managers would consider for loan performance 
evaluation, for example, industry trends, economic trends, geographic factors and political issues. 
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collectability evaluation. Borrowers’ repayment ability is assessed based on historical 
loan loss data and all current available information. However, past loss experiences or 
observable current data may be limited or not directly relevant to the specific current 
loan circumstances, thus managers’ judgments are necessary. In addition to the loan 
collectibility and borrowers’ repayment ability, as a survey report on bank loan 
classification and provisioning practices in Basel Core principles liaison group 
countries shows, bank managers could also choose to excise discretions on collaterals 
(World Bank Finance Forum, 2002). First of all, bank managers are allowed to excise 
their own judgments to decide the categories of collaterals which can be accepted 
when considering the loss provisioning for impaired loans. Second, bank managers 
can excise discretions on the evaluation and price of collaterals unless there is a 
consensus on how collaterals should be considered or collaterals have readily 
available market prices. In a word, the real loan classification phrase of loan loss 
provisioning is subjected to managerial discretions.  
<– Insert Table 2.1 around here –> 
In the second phase of loan loss provisioning, different from other countries’ 
practice, the U.S. regulators even do not provide any specific quantitative guideline 
on provisioning levels within each classified loan category 8 (KPMG Regulatoryalert, 
2004). Loan loss provisions are required to be sufficient to cover the estimated 
inherent loss in the U.S. (Handbook of Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of 
National Banks, 1998). Because the inherent loss estimate is derived from managers’ 
                                                 
8  In order to enable regulatory authorities to better consider whether loan loss provisions are 
appropriately and adequately calculated based on banks’ loan portfolios, central banks in many 
countries, for example, Singapore, Korea, and mainland China and Hong Kong have provided a 
provisioning schedule. However, the percentage reference system only works as a guideline. There are 
still plenty of spaces for discretion. Please refer to the appendix for details. 
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historical loss experience, this analytical process inevitably depends on managers’ 
empirical judgment, which is individual and subjective. Also, managers can choose to 
give weights to some performance forecasts where the data needs be extrapolated as 
long as they think it is necessary. Besides lack of specific quantitative guideline on 
loan loss provisioning, loan loss analysis is also required to be done on a loan-by-loan 
basis instead of the loan-portfolio basis. This makes the loan loss estimation and 
provisioning even more discretionary. The more complexity of the loan, the more 
judgmental the process is.  
In conclusion, the loan loss provision account is bank mangers’ natural choice for 
capital management. As bank loans are, by their economic nature, private, and there is 
not much market-based information available for accurate evaluation, managers’ 
judgments are necessary for both loan classification process and specific provisioning 
process under each classified loan category. Moreover, because the private 
information possessed by managers is not easily accessible and/ or expensive to be 
obtained, outside investors and regulators can hardly verify the validity of the 
managers’ judgments on loan loss provisions.  
Despite capital management, bank management may have some other objectives 
to reach via loan loss provisions. There are two other streams of studies on the 
manipulation of bank loan loss provisions for purposes other than capital regulatory 
ratios. The first stream of the literature has analyzed on the earnings management. As 
loan loss provisions are expenses on the income statement which reduce the earnings, 
managers would like to decrease loan loss provisions to pump up the reported 
earnings. The second stream of literature study focuses on the impact of reported loan 
loss provisions on stock returns (Docking et al., 1997; Grammatikos and Saunders, 
1990; Musumeci and Sinkey, 1990; Whalen, 1994). Whalen (1994) finds “bank loan 
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portfolio and default risks are likely to have an important impact on bank stock 
market values”. Specifically, unexpected loan loss provisions have a positive impact 
on stock returns. That is, investors think that the build-up of provisions by bank 
managers may lead to better earnings in the future. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) 
document similar results in their international sample. Although the positive impact of 
loan loss provision on stock performance is opposite to the studies of earnings 
management, the results are interpreted as signaling effect. 
 
2.3. Capital management vs. risk management  
 
Capital adequacy ratio within this new regime is defined as the ratio of regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted total assets. Risk–weighted assets are calculated by 
multiplying relevant risk-weights to assets of different categories. It is motivated by 
the concern that banks owners may choose a higher point with higher risk on the 
efficiency frontier to achieve higher return (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and 
Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). The Basel Accord designed a risk weighting system 
to deal with this moral hazard problem by improving banks’ internal risk 
measurement. As part of that, risk-weighted assets are designed to be the denominator 
of capital ratio. Is manipulating capital the only way to increase capital adequacy ratio 
under the Basel Accord? Do bank managers also manipulate capital adequacy ratio 
upward via reducing the denominator (risk-weighted total assets) instead of increasing 
the nominator (regulatory capital) only? The answer is that boosting up capital is still 
the most important way of meeting regulatory capital requirement. This is supported 
by two reasons. 
First, escalating exogenous costs of bank capital force bank managers to increase 
their risk exposures. Competition in banking industry has been tough over all these 
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years, which seriously reduce their profitability. The forced reduction of leverage 
level under the Basel Accord further diminishes expected returns from capital. These 
two factors give rise to bank managers’ preference on high-risk investment projects. 
This is supported by Jurg Blum (1999). In a dynamic model with incentives for asset 
substitution, this paper shows that capital adequacy rules actually increase banks’ 
risks. His explanation is that, if raising equity is excessively costly, banks choose to 
increase risk today to increase equity tomorrow. 
Second, although there are a lot more risk –adjustment tools available nowadays 
to change the risk of banks’ asset portfolio compare to years ago9, the manipulation 
space and effectiveness is restricted by stringent asset risk-weighting system 
embedded in the Based Accord. The Basel Capital Accord, by nature, aims to align 
regulatory capital more closely to their underlying credit risks. Risk–weighted total 
assets are calculated by multiplying relevant risk-weights to the value of both on-
balance sheet items and off-balance sheet items. Specified risk weight is assigned to 
each assets based on its relevant category classification, both for on-balance and off-
balance activities. Five weights are used, 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%. For example , 0% 
for cash and treasury securities, 20% for general obligation municipal bonds, 50% for 
loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property, or revenue municipal bonds, 
and 100% for all other loans and investments, premises and equipment. Under the 
Basel Accord, even off-balance-sheet activity is taken into account in the capital 
adequacy framework and risk weighted. All categories of off-balance-sheet 
engagements are first converted to credit risk equivalents by multiplying a credit 
conversion factor, the resulting amounts are then being weighted according to the 
nature of the equivalent on-balance sheet counterparty. It is not easy to manipulate 
                                                 
9 The most widely used vehicle is asset –backed securities (ABS), for example, credit default swaps, 
interest rate swaps. The development of an active market of loan sales and loan trading also facilitate 
banks to manage the asset risks. 
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assets risks. The assets categories and relevant risk weights are well specified in detail 
under the Basel Accord, thus it is not easy to manipulate the risk-weighted assets, the 
denominator of capital adequacy ratio. Furthermore, it is costly and technically 
difficult to forecast, measure, price, hedging or transfer the risks by using most of 
those risk- adjustment vehicles available in the market. 
In conclusion, excising discretions on capital is bank managers’ first choice when 
they consider manipulation of capital adequacy ratios. Thus, all my findings of capital 
management via loan loss provisions identified in this thesis is applicable to banks 
under the Basel Accord. They will also be valid for the Basel II regime if the United 
Sates adopts Basel II framework in the future because the basic structure of capital 
adequacy ratio is left unchanged in Basel II. 
 
2.4. Nonaudit service research review  
This thesis also investigates the association between nonaudit services and 
managerial manipulation in the U.S. banks. Nonaudit services and auditor 
independence is a research topic of paramount importance. Market investors rely on 
the audited financial information for their investment decision making. Regulators 
also take auditors’ opinion as crucial reference for their regulatory monitoring and 
regulation adjustment. Since the late 1980s, provision of nonaudit services has 
become a substantial revenue source of auditing firms besides the regular audit 
services, which economically bond auditors and their clients closely. Researchers 
believe that it is quite possible that this close economic connection would give 
auditors incentives to sacrifice their objectivity in order to attain the clients. This 
hypothesis has been tested in many empirical studies in the past ten years (Simunic, 
1984; Beck et al., 1988a; Pringle and Buchman, 1996; Craswell, 1999; DeFond et al, 
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2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kalllapur, 2003; Kinney 
et al., 2003; Francis and Ke, 2003; Ferguson et al., 2003; Larcker and Richardson, 
2004). 
 There are two major schools of theories to explain provision of nonaudit services 
and potential auditor independence impairment. Agency theory characterizes auditors’ 
bias as deliberate. In other words, provision of nonaudit services strengthens the 
economic bond between auditors and their important clients thereby increase auditors’ 
incentive to acquiesce to client pressure, including deliberately allowing managerial 
manipulation behaviors. As a consequence, auditor independence is seriously 
impaired and the quality and credibility of financial reporting information are 
negatively affected. Studies consistent with the agency theory include Simunic (1984), 
Beck et al. (1988a), Beeler and Hunton (2001), Frankel et al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), Chung and Kalllapur (2003), Larcker and Richardson (2004). In contrast to 
agency theory, behavioral literature suggests that psychological heuristics may 
unconsciously lead auditors to bias judgments (Beeler and Hunton, 2001).  
Although many researchers believe the agency theory story, empirical evidences 
of the association between nonaudit services and earnings quality are mixed and 
somehow, contrasting (see Table 2.2 for further explanation). Many studies, including 
DeAngelo (1981), Beck et al.(1988), Magee and Tseng (1990), show that the strong 
economic bonds between auditing firms and their clients impair auditor independence. 
Frankel et al. (2002) also finds significantly positive association between nonaudit 
service fee ratios and biased financial reporting actions. Francis and Ke (2001) and 
DeFond et al. (2002) provide opposite evidences. Francis and Ke (2001) use small 
reporting earnings increases as an earnings quality proxy. They find that that non-
audit fee ratio is not related to the likelihood of firms’ earnings management in the 
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tested sample. DeFond et al. (2002) also show no relation between firms’ going 
concern opinions (a measure of earnings quality) and magnitude of nonaudit services. 
Arrun˜ada (1999) does not find any significant association between discretionary 
actions and nonaudit service fees. He explains that auditors are not likely to 
jeopardize their independence to attain the clients because of the high reputation cost 
and litigation cost when get caught. 
<– Insert Table 2.2 around here –> 
Even for prior researcher papers which demonstrate significant association 
between earnings quality measures and nonaudit service fee ratios, it is still a question 
whether the auditor independence is really impaired. Auditor independence 
impairment is not directly observable. To solve this problem, researchers use low 
earnings quality as the independence impairment proxy. Different operational 
measures of earnings quality are used in prior related research, for example, the going 
concern, earnings restatement, security class actions alleging, qualified opinion 
earnings surprises, earnings conservatism and earnings abnormal accruals (see Table 
2.3 for further explanation). Among those earnings quality measures, discretionary 
earnings accrual is most frequently chosen as the measure of financial information 
quality to detect possible earnings manipulations (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Antle 
et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Dee et al., 2002; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Gore et al., 2001; Jenkins, 2003; Larcker and Richardson,2004). 
Therefore, the validity of audit independence hypothesis tests hinge on the validity of 
the following aspect: discretionary accruals could be used as a reliable operational 
measure of earnings quality.  
<– Insert Table 2.3 around here –> 
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The estimate of discretionary earnings accruals is subject to severe measurement 
error. Given the limited theory we have of how earnings accruals behave in the 
absence of discretion, the nondiscretionary component of earnings can not be readily 
isolated from its discretionary portion. Also, we have difficulties in identifying and 
controlling other potentially correlated omitted variables. Thus the measurement 
errors in discretionary accrual estimate can lead researchers to conclude that earnings 
management exists when it does not. Most of the models used in literature lack test 
power because of these two reasons mentioned above, including the most popular 
Jones model and modified Jones model (DeAngelo et al., 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Holthausen et al., 1995; Guay and Ross, 1996; McNichols, 2000). Dechow et al. 
(1995) demonstrate that Jones model, although have higher detection power than the 
other four alternative models 10 , still rejects null hypothesis of no earnings 
management at rates exceeding the specified test-levels especially in  samples  where 
firms have extreme financial performance. To be specific, the estimates of 
discretionary accruals from the Jones and modified Jones models appear to be too 
high (low) for firms with high (low) reported earnings, and too low (high) for firms 
with high (low) cash flow from operations. McNichols (2000) also shows that 
discretionary accruals models could be biased if the nondiscretionary accruals 
correlated with firm performance are not completely extracted.  
Banking industry provides us a much better experimental environment for the 
nonaudit service study. Kinney and Libby (2002) review many nonaudit service 
studies and conclude that the factual evidence of auditor independence impairment or 
the effectiveness of regulations on nonaudit services cannot be accurately obtained 
when nonaudit services are studied in isolation with comprehensive institutional 
                                                 
10 The five discretionary accrual models evaluated are Healy model (1985), DeAngelo model (1986), 
Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1991) and the industry model (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
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settings. By focusing on a single industry, the discretionary behaviors detection can be 
more powerful since the related managerial incentives and audit contracting can be 
better understood. Management manipulations have been widely studied and well-
understood in highly regulated banking industry (Moyer, 1990; Stinson, 1993; Beatty 
et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; Bishop, 1996). Unlike other industries, private 
contract incentives do not influence bank manager’s accounting choices as much as 
they do in non-banking firms (Smith and Watts, 1986; Moyer, 1988). The most 
recognized manipulation incentives in the banking industry are regulatory capital and 
earnings (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et 
al., 1995). 
Also, by focusing on a single accrual - loan loss provision in banking industry, the 
estimate of abnormal accrual is more reliable. Theoretically, there are two critical 
criteria in choosing a measure of accruals. First, the measure should be sensitive to 
hypothesized manipulation. Second, its nondiscretionary component can be better 
controlled comparing to other abnormal accrual detection models. The loan loss 
provision account better satisfies these two key requirements than other accrual 
measures. First, as discussed in part 2.2, loan loss provisions are very sensitive to 
capital and earnings management. Loan loss provisions are mechanically linked to 
capital adequacy ratios via loan loss reserves. Also, loan loss provisions can decrease 
income before tax since they are expenses set aside to account for bad loans in the 
profit and loss statement. Second, the nondiscretionary component of loan loss 
provision can be readily developed in the banking context, as the researcher can rely 
on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to fairly understand what 
fundamentals should be reflected in the account in the absence of manipulations. 
Researchers can make a fairly reliable prediction about the frequency of loan loss 
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provisions realization which is not caused by the nondiscretionary components of loan 
loss provisions (Scholes et al., 1990). Based on what have been discussed above, I 
expect nonaudit service tests designed in this specific banking industry study to have 













































U.S. Five -Grade Loan Classification System for Commercial Banks 
 
Loan Grade Criteria 
Standard Loans Loans in this category are performing and have sound 
fundamentals. (Fundamentals include the borrower’s 
overall financial condition, resources and cash flow, 
credit history, and character. They also include the 
purpose of the loan, and types of secondary sources of 
repayment). 
Specially  mentioned 
Loans 
 
Loans in this category are performing, but have potential 
weaknesses which, if not corrected, may weaken the 
loan and the bank’s asset quality. Examples are: credit 
that the lending officer is unable to properly supervise, 
an inadequate loan agreement, uncertainty of the 





Loans in this category have well-defined weaknesses, 
where the current sound worth and paying capacity of 





Doubtful loans exhibit all the characteristics of 
substandard loans, with the added characteristics that 
collection in full is highly questionable and improbable. 
Classification of “loss” is deferred because of specific 
pending factors which may strengthen the asset. Such 
factors include merger, acquisition, or liquidation 
procedures, capital injection, perfecting liens on 




Loss loans are considered uncollectible and of such little 
value that their continuance as bankable assets is not 
warranted. This classification does not mean that the 
asset has absolutely no recovery or salvage value, but 
rather that it is not practical or desirable to defer full 
provision or writing off this basically worthless loan. 
Partial recovery may be affected in the future. 
  
Note: Loans that are classified as substandard, doubtful or loss are collectively known as  











Nonaudit Services Research Review 
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Note: The exhibit presents a brief literature review of mixed results of the association between the 
provision of nonaudit services and auditor independence. Basically the literature reveals three types 
of relation: positive, negative and no association. Most papers find no empirical evidence that the 
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GRWA) 1.25%LLR LLR(if Exceeding -Asset weighted-Risk 
Capital 2Tier  Capital 1Tier   Ratio Capital Total >
+=  
 
LLR: loan loss reserves; GRWA: gross risk-weighted assets 
 
 
Step1: Compute Tier I capital 
 
(a) Permanent shareholders’ equity: 
     Fully-paid ordinary shares/common stock (CS) 
     Perpetual non-cumulative preference shares (PS) 
(b) Disclosed reserves: 
      Retained earnings (RE) 
      Mandatory convertible debt (CD) 
      Legal reserves (LR) 
      Other surplus (OS) 
 
Step2: Compute Tier II capital 
 
(a) Undisclosed reserves(UR) 
(b) Asset revaluation reserves (AR) 
(c) Loan-loss reserves (LLR) 
(d) Hybrid capital instruments (CI) 
(e) Subordinated term debt (TD) 
 
Restrictions of Tier II capital: 
(i)   The total of Tier II capital is limited to a maximum of 100% of the total of Tier I 
capital; 
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(ii)  Subordinated term debt is limited to a maximum of 50% of Tier I capital; 
(iii) Loan loss reserves included in Tier II capital are limited to a maximum of 1.25 
percentages of risk-weighted assets; 
(iv) Asset revaluation reserves which take the form of latent gains on unrealized 
securities is subject to a discount of 55%. 
 
Step3: compute total capital 
Total Capital= Tier I capital+ Tier II capital- Deductions 
Deductions from Total capital: 
(a) Investments in subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities which 
are not consolidated in national systems, to prevent the multiple uses of the 
same capital resources in different parts of the group.  
(b) Investments in the capital of other banks and financial institutions, to avoid 
the cross-holdings of bank capital designed artificially to inflate bank capital 
positions. 
 
Step4: compute risk –weighted assets (RWA) 
RWA is calculated by multiplying relevant risk-weights to the value of both on-
balance sheet items and off-balance sheet items. 
 
On-Balance Sheet Items 
Risk Categories: The framework of weights has been designed in a very simple way 






Balance Sheet Risk Assets 
Risk  
Weight 
Cash, Claims on central governments and central banks or claims , 
Federal balances, Treasury securities 
0% 
General obligation municipal bonds, claims on multilateral 
development banks, or cash items in process of collection 
20% 
Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property , or 
Revenue municipal bonds 
50% 
 
All other loans and investments, premises and equipment 
100% 
 
 Off-Balance Sheet Items 
In the Basel Accord, all off-balance-sheet activity is taken into account in the capital 
adequacy framework. All categories of off-balance-sheet engagements are converted 
to credit risk equivalents by multiplying a credit conversion factor, the resulting 
amounts then being weighted according to the nature of the equivalent on-balance 
sheet counterparty. Credit conversion ratios are derived from the estimated size and 
likely occurrence of the credit exposure, as well as the relative degree of credit risk as 
identified in the Committee’s paper “The management of banks’ off-balance sheet 
exposures: a supervisory perspective” issued in March 1986. 
 




Other loan commitments with an original maturity of up to one 
year ,or which can be unconditionally cancelled at anytime 
 
0% 
Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies, eg, 
commercial letter of credit 
 
20% 
Transaction-related contingent items, note issuance facilities and 
revolving underwriting facilities 
 
50% 
Direct credit substitute, sale and repurchase agreements, asset 
sales with recourse, Forward asset purchases, forward deposits 




Total Risk –Weighted Assets (RWA) =Adjusted On-Balance Sheet Items + Adjusted 





ILLUSTRATION   2.2 
The Effect of Loan Loss Provisions on Tier I and Tier II Capital 
 under the Basel Adequacy Accord 
 
 
I. Primary capital and Tier I capital  
 
 
Primary Capital before the Basel Accord 
 
Primary capital consists of: 
a) Fully-paid ordinary shares/common stock( CS) 
b) Perpetual non-cumulative preference shares(PS) 
c) Retained earnings(RE) 
d) Loan loss reserves( LLR) 
e) Mandatory convertible debt(CD) 
f) Legal reserves(LR) 
g) Other surplus(OS) 
 
AssetsTotalGross
Ratio CapitalPrimary OSLRCDLLRREPSCS ++++++=  
 
LLP is related to LLR and RE. TTTT LWOLLPLLPLLR −+= −1 ,that is , one unit 
increase of LLP increase LLR by one unit .However, in the income statement  LLP  
decrease the RE by (1-t) unit, t is the tax rate. Therefore, the net effect of LLP on 
primary capital is the tax shield of LLP, AssetsTotalGross
* LLPt
, in one word, LLP 
increase primary capital before the Basel Accord. 
 
Tier I Capital after the Basel Accord 
 
GRWA) 1.25%LLR LLR(if Exceeding -Asset weighted-Risk 




LLR is removed from the numerator of Tier I capital, therefore the net effect of LLP 






1) When LLR<1.25%GRWA, net effect of LLP is 
Asset weighted-Risk 
*)1( LLPt−− , LLP 
has negative effect on Tier I capital ratio 
 
 










Take the differentiate of the above formula respect to LLP, to make it looks simple, 



















   -(1-t)*LLP is the numerator , and(b*LLP+c) is the denominator, the condition need 


























Assume the tax rate t=34%, we only need the denominator >1.5 times numerator so 
that LLP has negative effect on Tier I capital even when LLR is larger than 1.25% of 
risk-weighted assets. And this criterion can be fully satisfied in most banks. Therefore 
LLP decrease Tier I capital ratio after the Basel Accord in stead of increasing before 
1988. 
 
II. Secondary Capital and Tier II capital  
 
 
Secondary capital after the Basel Accord 
 
Secondary capital before Basel Accord consists of: 
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(a) Undisclosed reserves(UR) 
(b) Asset revaluation reserves (AR) 
(c) Hybrid capital instruments (CI) 
(d) Subordinated term debt (TD) 
 
AssetsTotalGross 




Tier II Capital after the Basel Accord 
 
Loan loss reserves (LLR) are shifted from primary capital before 1988 to Tier II 
capital under the Basel Adequacy Accord, however, LLR qualifies to be included in 
Tier II capital is limited to 1.25% of Gross Risk-Weighted Assets (GRWA). 
 
GRWA) 1.25%LLR LLR(if Exceeding -Asset weighted-Risk 




The net effect of LLP on Tier II capital is:  
 
GRWA) 1.25%LLR LLR(if Exceeding -Asset weighted-Risk >
LLP  
 
























Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Capital management hypotheses of both Tier I 
capital and Tier II capital are presented in section 3.1. Section 3.2 is about the 
hypotheses related to earnings management incentive and its conflict with Tier II 
capital management incentive. Next to that is the discussion of the impact of nonaudit 
service level on the association between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions. 
Hypothesis of variability of nonaudit service fees is described in section 3.4. Lastly, 
section 3.5 presents the development of size effect hypothesis. 
 
3.1. Capital management   
 
The United States started to implement the Basel Accord through issuance of 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. This new capital 
system seeks to improve existing rules by aligning regulatory capital requirements 
more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. Since 1991, it is supervised by 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Banks’ 
capital ratios are reviewed regularly on the Call Report or Thrift Financial Report. 
Moreover, banks are required to do “Capital Adequacy Quantitative Disclosures” on a 
consolidated basis. This disclosure requirement is applicable to not only parent banks, 
  36
but also to their significant bank subsidiaries (stand alone or sub-consolidated 
depending on how the framework is applied). 
The Basel Accord substantially changes the association between regulatory capital 
and loan loss provisions, leading to new predictions about banks manipulation 
behaviors. Prior to 1991, banks with low primary or total capital ratios are likely to 
boost up capital ratios by inflating loan loss provisions (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 
1995; Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed et al., 1999). This is because the net effect of 
loan loss provisions on primary capital is the tax shield of loan loss provisions11. The 
loan loss provision account is mechanically linked to retained earnings and loan loss 
reserves, both of which are included in primary capital in the old regime. Although 
$X increase of loan loss provisions decreases retained earnings by $X (1-T) (T is the 
tax rate), it increases loan loss reserves by $X in the same time. Thus the net effect of 
$X loan loss provisions increase on primary capital is the tax shield of loan loss 
provisions $X*T. 
Under the Basel Accord, not only the composition and computation of regulatory 
capital are changed, the minimum level requirements are also different. Tier I and 
Tier II capital are introduced to replace primary and supplementary capital. Tier I 
capital represents mainly equity capital and published reserves from post-tax retained 
earnings. It includes shareholder’s equity, non-cumulative perpetual preference stock 
and minority interests. Under the new regime, Tier II capital includes loan loss 
reserves, preference shares, hybrid capital instrument, subordinate term debt and 
perpetual debt. More importantly, the association between loan loss provisions and 
regulatory capital has been changed because 1) different from primary capital, loan 
                                                 
11 In the income statement, Loan loss provisions are the expenses that should be deducted from income 
before tax. )1)(( tLLPNI −−= α . In the balance sheet, Loan loss provisions are related to loan loss 
reserves, TTTT LWOLLPLLPLLR −+= −1 , one unit increase of loan loss provisions increase loan 
loss reserves by one unit . 
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loss reserves are no longer included in Tier I capital; 2) different from secondary 
capital, loan loss reserves have been included as important components in Tier II 
capital with an upper bound of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Furthermore, the Basel 
Accord brings up minimum capital adequacy requirements from primary capital ratio 
of 5.5%, total capital ratio of 6%, to Tier I capital ratio of 4% and total capital ratio of  
8 % to be “adequately-capitalized”12 (for the U.S. banks, 8% was implemented at the 
end of 1992; from 1988 to December 1990, minimum total capital ratio was 7.25%).  
It is worthwhile investigating how banks adjust their manipulation mechanisms in 
response to the above policy changes under the Basel Accord. I expect manipulation 
mechanisms to change at least in three aspects. First, in contrast to the negative 
relationship between loan loss provisions and primary capital, loan loss provisions 
and Tier I capital are positively associated under the Basel Accord. As loan loss 
reserves are no longer included in Tier I capital, the overall effect of $X increase in 
loan loss provisions is a reduction in retained earnings by $X (1-t). Loan loss 
provisions decrease Tier I capital (instead of increasing primary capital in the old 
regime) starting from 1991. In other words, banks with lower Tier I capital are likely 
to decrease loan loss provisions to reach the targeted capital adequacy ratios.  
Secondly, Tier II capital has become a new option for total capital management 
under the Basel Accord. Besides 4% of Tier I capital ratio, banks are required to 
achieve the 8% total capital ratio threshold. Under the new regulation system, 
although being removed from Tier I capital, loan loss reserves still count as an 
                                                 
12  The Basel Accord does not define zone of scrutiny. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 specify capital adequacy zones to measure capital 
strength as follows: Well-Capitalized – total risk-based capital ratio is 10%or more, or Tier I risk-based 
capital ratio is 6% or more; Adequately Capitalized – total risk-based capital ratio exceeds 8%, or Tier 
I risk-based capital ratio is at least 4%; Undercapitalized – Total risk-based capital ratio is less 8%, or 
Tier I risk-based capital ratio is less than 4%;Significantly Undercapitalized – Total risk-based capital 
ratio is less than 6%, or Tier I risk-based capital ratio is less than 3 %.  
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important part of Tier II capital13. $X increase of loan loss provisions raises Tier II 
capital by $X. This implies that loan loss provisions have net positive impact on Tier 
II capital. Banks with low Tier II capital can reach total capital requirement via 
inflating loan loss provisions. 
Lastly, the benefit of Tier II capital manipulations will be maximized for banks 
with low loan loss reserve level. It is required by the Basel Accord that loan loss 
reserves qualified to be included in Tier II capital is up to 1.25% of risk-weighted 
assets.  This upper bound encourages banks with low loan loss reserves to maximize 
capital manipulation benefit. On the contrary, banks with loan loss reserves above this 
upper bound are less likely to engage in Tier II capital management. Banks with high 
loan loss reserves generally have high capital, which would reduce their capital 
management incentives.  
Summarized what have been discussed above, my hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H1.1:  Banks are likely to decrease loan loss provisions to increase Tier I capital in 
the Basel capital regime.  
 
H1.2:  Banks are likely to increase loan loss provisions to increase Tier II capital in 
the Basel capital regime. 
 
H1.3:  Banks with low loan loss reserves to risk-adjusted assets ratios are likely to 





                                                 
13 Basel Capital Accord 1998 April version: “General provisions or general loan-loss reserves are 
created against the possibility of losses not yet identified. Where they do not reflect a known 
deterioration in the valuation of particular assets, these reserves qualify for inclusion in tier 2 capital. 
Where, however, provisions or reserves have been created against identified losses or in respect of an 
identified deterioration in the value of any asset or group of subsets of assets …should therefore not be 
included in the capital base”. 
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3.2. Earnings management 
 
In addition to regulatory capital, loan loss provisions are sensitive to bank 
earnings management. Thus it is important to control the earnings management 
incentives in the tests of capital management hypotheses. Earnings management 
incentives arise because regulators monitor banks based on earnings. Scholes et al. 
(1990) show that bank managers can lower cost of capital by using earnings to convey 
private information to investors. Additionally, loan loss provisions are used for 
earnings smoothing purpose. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Hasan and Wall (2004) 
report worldwide empirical evidences which are consistent with the earnings 
smoothing hypothesis. Similar researches on earnings management via loan loss 
provisions also include Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Barth, Beaver and WoKson 
(1990), Clinch and Magliolo (1993), Haw, Jung and Lilien (1992), Collins et al. (1995) 
and Beatty et al. (1995). 
Loan loss provisions are also manageable in the income statement. Taxable net 
income of a bank can generally be increased by interest income, service revenues, 
securities gains and losses. It can be reduced by interest expense, operating costs, loan 
loss provisions, and income tax expense. Generally banks have difficulties to 
significantly change interest income or expense, service revenues or operating costs 
during financial periods or at the year-end. As discussed in part 2.2, because both the 
loan classification process and loan loss provisioning within each classified loan 
category are matters of judgment, the loan loss provision account is the only income 
component that can be revised interim and adjustable at the year-end.  
Loan loss provisions purely work as expenses to decrease taxable income in the 
profit and loss statement. $X increase of loan loss provisions can reduce the net 
income after tax by $X* (1-T), T is the tax rate. This means that bank managers will 
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be able to report smooth earnings via exercising discretion on the magnitude and 
timing of loan loss provisions. Both Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) and Collins et al. 
(1995) find positive relation between loan loss provisions and reported earnings, 
implying that banks with poor real earnings performance generally record less loan 
loss provisions in order to inflate reported earnings. I expect a significant positive 
relation between real earnings and loan loss provisions. In other words, bank 
managers would like to decrease loan loss provisions if they would like to increase 
earnings. 
Also, I expect the interaction between earnings management and capital 
managements via loan loss provisions differ markedly from what it was in the old 
regime. Loan loss provisions had conflicting impact on earnings and capital before 
1991. Although loan loss provisions can increase primary capital, doing so also 
decrease taxable income in the same time. Differs from that, I expect the Basel capital 
rules align earnings and capital management incentives. As demonstrated in part 3.1, 
banks are likely decrease (instead of increase) loan loss provisions to boost up Tier I 
capital. In order words, $X reduction in loan loss provisions can increase both net 
income after tax and Tier I capital by $X (1-t). Banks can manipulate earnings upward 
without worrying about the decrease of capital (as they did in the old regime). I use 
the earning before tax and loan loss provisions (EBTP) to proxy the real earnings. In 
addition, in order to test whether banks have different management incentives when 
they experience complete losses, an alternative variable is used. “LOSS” represents 
negative EBTP. Banks with low earnings or pure LOSS may have strong earnings 
management incentives.  
In contrast to Tier I capital, earnings management incentive via loan loss 
provisions conflict with Tier II capital motive. $X reduction in loan loss provisions 
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increases the net income after tax by $X (1-t), it also decreases the Tier II capital by 
$X in the same time. It is interesting to investigate bank managers’ reaction to Tier II 
capital management when banks have strong earnings management incentives. This 
can be done by testing the interaction between Tier II capital and an earnings 
management incentive variable. Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) suggest that 
managers tend to manage earnings to exceed three thresholds, and they set priority of 
meeting one threshold over meeting another. Managers seek to meet zero earnings 
first, and then earnings of prior corresponding period. Analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
the last targets they intend to meet. In other words, avoiding losses and earnings 
decreases seems to be the most important goal that managers seek to achieve in their 
sample period. Similarly, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that firms 
manage reported earnings to avoid earnings losses and decreases. Following the 
literature, I use both negative earnings and earnings decrease as the earnings 
management incentive proxies to interact with Tier II capital. 
I expect a bank to prefer managing earnings instead of Tier II capital when there is 
a loss or an earnings decrease from the previous year. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
document that reaching the zero earnings threshold is the firms’ highest priority.  
Banks with good earnings performance can enjoy lower cost of capital. They can also 
using earnings to convey positive private information to market investors. The earning 
of the previous year is another important target banks need to beat. Consistent 
earnings increases, especially earnings increase for longer series can enable banks to 
benefit from positive market return. After controlling earnings levels, Barth et al. 
(1995) report that firms with consistent earnings increases usually have higher price-
to-earnings ratios. Additionally, this market premium is larger for a firm who 
maintains a longer series of earnings increases, and the premium is eliminated or 
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diminished when the earnings increase pattern is broken. DeAngelo et al. (1996) 
quantify the market premium of consistent earnings increases. They show that firms 
experience an average of 14% negative abnormal stock return in the year the 
consistent earnings growth pattern is broken. In the study comparing the earnings 
management between pubic and privately held banks, Betty et al (2002) find that 
public banks are more likely to be involved in earnings manipulations. Specifically 
public banks are more likely to use loan loss provisions to eliminate small earnings 
decreases, and to report longer strings of consecutive earnings increases.  Therefore, 
among banks with the same level of Tier II capital, I expect banks to have strong 
incentives to avoid reporting negative earnings or earnings decrease, and the incentive 
appears to increase in the length of the previous earnings increase string. Furthermore, 
according to the Basel Accord, Tier II capital upward manipulation space is limited. 
Tier II capital in total capital can not exceeds 50% of Tier I capital, and loan loss 
provisions includable in Tier II capital is up to an upper bound of 1.25% of risk-
weighted total assets. As discussed above, I summarize my hypothesis as follows: 
H2.1:  Banks with low earnings before loan loss provisions and tax and loan loss 
provisions (EBTP) are likely to decrease loan loss provisions to increase 
earnings in the Basel capital regime. 
 
H2.2:   Among banks with the same level of Tier II capital ratios, banks with negative 
earnings or earnings decrease would like to manage earnings by decreasing 
loan loss provisions (instead of increasing for Tier II capital purpose) in the 
Basel capital regime. 
 
 
3.3. Level of nonaudit service fee ratios 
The hypothesis of the impact of nonaudit service fees on banks’ capital 
management incentives is motivated by the fact that nonaudit service purchases 
prevail in the same period as the implementation of the Basel Accord. U.S. banks 
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adopted the Basel Adequacy Accord in 1991. According to SEC reports, nonaudit 
service fees have increased substantially since the 1990s. Not only nonaudit service 
fees grow up to 51% of total audit fees (Abbott, Parker and Rama, 2003), the 
proportion of corporations purchasing nonaudit services has also increased 
significantly, from 25% in 1991 to 96% in 2000. Is this a coincidence? Or is there any 
causality between the two events? The association between Basel regulatory capital 
and nonaudit services raise is really worthwhile to look into. Investigating the 
nonaudit service impact on capital management incentives is also very important. 
Same as other non-banking industries, auditors play an important role in banks. 
Regulators, including Federal Reserve, are interested in the opinions of external 
auditors. They regard their opinion as critical reference to facilitate their supervision 
and monitoring over the institutions they supervise. However, the impacts of nonaudit 
services have not been empirically examined in banks before. Will the benefits 
derived from the external audits diminish in banks that purchase large amount of 
nonaudit services?  
It is worthwhile to empirically investigate the association between nonaudit fees 
and banks’ management behavior via loan loss provisions within the new Basel 
capital adequacy framework. Literature evidences support that nonaudit service fees 
are associated with observable difference in earnings quality proxies (DeAngelo 1981; 
Beck et al., 1988; Magee and Tseng 1990; Francis and Ke, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; 
DeFond et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). In the banking industry, loan loss 
provisions have been used as an important measure for financial reporting quality 
(Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1990; Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Moyer, 1990; 
Beatty et al., 1995; Collins, et al, 1995; Kim and Kross, 1998; Ahmed et al., 1999). 
They are closely linked to both earnings and capital by construction. This implies the 
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existence of an empirical relationship between nonaudit service fees and loan loss 
provisions. 
High level of nonaudit services are generally found to have adverse effects on 
financial quality in many industries (DeAngelo, 1981; Beck, Frecka and Solomon 
1988; Magee and Tseng, 1990; Francis and Ke, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; DeFond et 
al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ferguson, Seow, and Young, 2004; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004). The adverse impact is mainly explained by the agency theory. 
Agency theory characterizes auditors’ bias as deliberate. Agency theory believes that 
the provision of nonaudit services aligns auditors and their audited firms closely when 
nonaudit services become the substantial revenue source of auditors besides their 
regular audit services. This economic bond increases auditor’s incentive to acquiesce 
the client pressure, including deliberately allowing management manipulations 
(Simunic 1984; Beck et al., 1988).  I expect auditors’ acquiescence to managerial 
behaviors to be even stronger in banks. Banks have capital targets to reach besides 
earnings. Bank managers can manipulate both regulatory capital and earnings upward 
simultaneously by reducing loan loss provisions under the Basel Accord regime. And 
this, gives bank managers more incentive to “bribe” auditors by providing “bigger 
rent”. Following the agency theory, I hypothesize that nonaudit services strengthen 
the association between regulatory capital and discretionary loan loss provisions. 
H3:   Comparing to banks with low nonaudit service fee ratios, banks with high 
nonaudit fee ratios are more likely to: 1) decrease loan loss provisions for Tier 




3.4. Variability of nonaudit service fees  
  Besides the level of nonaudit service fee ratios, variability of nonaudit service 
fee ratios can also influence banks’ manipulation behaviors. Variability here describes 
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the purchase consistency in the perspective of frequency. In recent years both the 
frequency and magnitude of nonaudit service purchase vary vastly across different 
companies. Even for the same firm, the amount of consumed nonaudit service 
changes largely from year to year. Banks who have consumed nonaudit services 
regularly and consistently over years are highly likely to have different capital 
manipulation incentives from those who only purchase nonaudit service sparsely. This 
motivates this study to use the variability of nonaudit service fee ratios - a new proxy 
for the tightness of economic bond between auditors and banks, to investigate the 
association between nonaudit service fee and capital management incentives from the 
perspective of purchase frequency under the Basel Accord. 
The variability of nonaudit service fee ratios can affect the banks’ manipulation 
incentives in two different ways. Regular and consistent nonaudit service purchases 
can encourage banks’ manipulation engagement. Beck et al. (1988) show that, if the 
nonaudit services becomes a recurring revenue source of an auditing firm, the 
economic bond between the firm and its clients is much stronger. They explain that it 
is the high start-up and switching costs which induce auditors to be more acquiescent 
to their regular clients. Similarly, Parkash and Venable (1993) demonstrate that 
because auditors perceive the recurred services as steady annuity, auditee’s 
purchasing behavior of recurring nonaudit services is highly influenced by agency 
incentives.  
Consistent nonaudit service purchases can affect banks managerial behaviors the 
other way around. In other words, nonaudit services of low variability may constrain 
managers’ manipulation actions. This hypothesis could be especially true after year 
2001. Auditor independence has received the highest attention it ever has from 
researchers, regulators and public investors since 2001. Many research publications 
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have investigated the association between nonaudit services and financial reporting 
quality (Ferguson, Seow, and Young, 2004; Gore et al., 2001; Larcker and Richardson, 
2004; Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, and Zhou, 2002; Craswell, Stokes and 
Laughton, 2002; Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant, 2003). Most of these papers 
demonstrate that nonaudit services are related to potential auditor independence 
impairment and low accountability of financial reporting. In view of this, many 
stringent legislative interventions are enacted, aiming to restrict excessive supply of 
nonaudit services and to require full disclosure of audit fees. For example, SEC issued 
Final Rule [File No. S7-13-00]: Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence 
Requirements (hereafter SEC rule (2000)) (see Illustration 3.1 for further explanation) 
in November 2000. This rule requires firms, starting from February 5, 2001, to 
disclose all detailed audit fee information in recent years. Besides regulatory 
institutions, as shown by Francis (2006), market investors also react negatively to 
firms with high nonaudit fees when they perceive the nonaudit service fees as 
representation of dishonesty and low audit quality. Hence, regular and consistent 
purchase of nonaudit services within this period would not only pose high litigation 
risk on auditors, but also trigger negative stock market reactions to audited banks. 
<– Insert Illustration 3.1 around here–> 
The firm-specific standard deviation of nonaudit service fee ratios is used to proxy 
nonaudit service purchase variability14 lower the standard deviation, more consistent 
nonaudit service purchases over sample years.  As discussed above, as I do not have 
any prior directional prediction on the impact of nonaudit service purchase frequency 
                                                 
14 Although the SEC (2003) prohibit registrants from purchasing financial information systems design 
and implementation services and internal audit outsourcing from incumbent auditor, this does not affect 
data consistency over sample period. Registrants may still purchase many types of non-audit services, 
including tax compliance and consulting, employee plan audits, consulting on accounting matters, 
merger and acquisition consulting, and consulting on new debt and equity issues. 
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on capital management incentives, I thus summarize the hypothesis in the alternative 
form as follows: 
H4:     Comparing to banks with high nonaudit service fee variability, banks with low 
variability of nonaudit service fee ratios are more (less) likely: 1) decrease 
loan loss provisions for Tier I capital management purpose; 2) increase loan 
loss provisions for Tier II capital management. 
 
3.5. Size effect  
 
The associations between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions are not 
expected to be the same across banks of different size. Thus it is important to 
investigate the size effect on banks’ capital manipulation incentives under the Basel 
Accord. According to prior related research, the prediction of capital management 
motives in large banks and small banks both can go two opposing directions. 
Prior researches document two-way stories about the manipulation incentives of 
large banks. Rangan (1998) and Myers and Skinner (2000) show that big firms are 
more likely to engage in managerial manipulations. Barton and Simko (2002) offer an 
explanation. Comparing to small firms, they think big firms generally face higher 
pressure to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts because stock market punishes them more 
severely for losses or falling below analysts’ expectations. High costs of missing 
market expectations induce tremendous demand of manipulations in big firms. On the 
other hand, these incentives can be restricted by huge reputation cost and litigation 
risks they may face when they get caught. Being caught of manipulations would 
substantially diminish their credibility and reputation in the business community 
which have been buildup after years of effort. As demonstrated in literature, big firms 
also face higher litigation risk than small firms (Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998; 
Kellogg, 1984; Lys and Watts, 1994; Stice, 1991). Besides the reputation and 
litigation constraints, strong bargaining power possessed by big firms can also lower 
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their manipulation incentives.  Bishop (1996) tests a “too big to fail” hypothesis in his 
paper. As shown by the results, large banks could continually violate capital adequacy 
requirements without provoking regulatory interventions because they are “too big to 
fail”. 
Similarly, current literature has opposing views on manipulation incentives of 
small firms. Small firms generally have higher manipulation demand to achieve 
smooth performance. Because of lack of diversification and small production scale, 
financial performance of small firms is normally more volatile than large firms. For 
the same level of adverse change in external market environment, small firms usually 
suffer more drastic earnings decreases or losses. In additional to small firms’ higher 
manipulation demand, their inefficient internal auditing and control systems facilitate 
them to engage in real manipulation actions with reasonably lower detection risk. 
However, the story can go the other way around. Small firms on the whole are subject 
to very strict oversight by federal regulators and market investors than their large size 
counterparts, which suggests that discretionary behaviors are less likely.  
Therefore I do not have any prior prediction of the direction of size effect on 
banks’ manipulation incentives. I state the hypothesis as follows:  
H4:    Small banks are more(less) likely to have capital management incentives. In 
other words, small banks are more (less) likely to: 1) decrease loan loss 
provisions for Tier I capital management 2) increase loan loss provisions for 
















The SEC rule (2000) and Audit Services Pre-approval Policy 
 
The Illustration reports major regulatory requirement related to nonaudit services after 
year 2000. SEC filed “Final Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor 
Independence Requirements” [File No. S7-13-00] in November 2000, requiring firms, 
starting from February 5, 2001, to disclose: 1) audit fees; 2) IS fees; 3) audit-related 
fees; 4) tax fees; and 5) all other fees. They are described in audit and nonaudit 
services pre-approval policy as follows:  
• Audit services include the annual financial statement audit (including 
required quarterly reviews), subsidiary audits, and other procedures required 
to be performed by the independent auditor to be able to form an opinion on 
the Company's consolidated financial statements. These other procedures 
include information systems and procedural reviews and testing performed in 
order to understand and place reliance on the systems of internal control, and 
consultations relating to the audit or quarterly review. Audit services also 
include the attestation engagement for the independent auditor's report on 
management's report on internal controls for financial reporting, when 
required. 
• IS services include financial information system design and implementation. 
• Audit-related services include, among others, due diligence services 
pertaining to potential business acquisitions/dispositions; accounting 
consultations related to accounting, financial reporting or disclosure matters 
not classified as "Audit services"; assistance with understanding and 
implementing new accounting and financial reporting guidance from 
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rulemaking authorities; financial audits of employee benefit plans; agreed-
upon or expanded audit procedures related to accounting and/or billing records 
required to respond to or comply with financial, accounting or regulatory 
reporting matters; and assistance with internal control reporting requirements.  
• Tax services include tax compliance, tax planning and tax advice 
• All Other services include permissible nonaudit services15 that are routine and 
recurring services, would not impair the independence of the auditor and are 



























                                                 
15 Prohibited Non-Audit Services in SEC filed Final Rule include: bookkeeping or other services 
related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information 
systems design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services and fairness opinions; actuarial 
services; internal audit services; management functions; human resources; broker-dealer, investment 









RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
 
 Here is the outline of chapter 4. Regulatory capital, earnings and other control 
variables in the basic capital management hypotheses tests are described in section 4.1. 
Section 4.2 is about the tests design of cross-sectional variations of capital 
management mechanisms across different banks. Following that, I present the 
discretionary loan loss provisions estimation in section 4.3. Lastly, I demonstrate 
sample selection process and report descriptive statistics in section 4.4. 
 
4.1. Regulatory capital and earnings variables 
 
The basic capital management hypotheses tests are designed based on banks’ 
managerial manipulation incentives identified in literature. Unlike other industries, 
private contract incentives, such as bonus plans, debt agreements and costs of capital, 
do not influence bank manager’s accounting choices as much as they do in non-
banking firms. Smith and Watts (1986) compare the impact of bonus plans and costs 
of capital in banks and non-banks. They report that only 67% of banks have 
accounting-based bonus plans. In contrast, the percentage is as high as 91% in non-
banking firms. They also examine the impact of capital costs on banks’ accounting 
choices. Their results show that the impact is very trivial and insignificant. Moyer 
(1988) further demonstrates that there is no association between dividend covenants 
and accounting adjustments in commercial banks. The two most recognized 
accounting-adjusting motivations in the banking industry are regulatory capital 
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adequacy requirements and earnings (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Moyer, 1990; 
Beatty et al., 1995; Stinson, 1993; Collins et al., 1995). My capital management 
detection model (formula 1) is designed based on these two well-understood 
management incentives. 
Tier I capital and Tier II capital (T1C, T2C) are used to capture the capital 
management incentives under the Basel Accord. It is important to test these two 
regulatory capitals together because bank managers can manage to achieve regulatory 
capital adequacy requirements through excising discretions on either one of them. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter 3, the management mechanisms associated 
with Tier I capital and Tier II capital are totally different under the Basel Accord. 
Following Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahemad et al. (1999), I use adjusted Tier I 
capital and adjusted Tier II capital (see Illustration 4.1 Tier I and Tier II capital 
adjustments). In order to capture the significant impact of loan loss reserve levels, I 
also include the ratio of loan loss reserves (before loan loss provisions of current year) 
to risk-weighted assets (LLR) in the model. Because loan loss reserves includable in 
Tier II capital are limited to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets in the Basel regime, banks 
with different levels of loan loss reserves would have different capital management 
incentives. In addition, to examine the conflicts between Tier II capital and earnings 
management incentives, I add two dummy variables to interact with Tier II capital, 
NEG and DECRE. As hypothesized in section 3.2, among banks with same level of 
Tier II capital, banks with a loss or an earnings decrease from the previous year may 
choose to decrease loan loss provisions for earnings management purpose instead of 
increasing loan loss provisions. NEG equals to one if there is a loss in a bank, and 
DECRE equals to one if there is an earnings decrease from the previous year. These 
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two earnings management incentive proxies are represented by EAR in the model. 
Interaction between Tier II capital and each of the two proxies are tested separately. 
<–Insert Illustration 4.1 around here–> 
As earnings are mechanically linked with loan loss provisions, it is necessary to 
control the earnings management incentive. EBTP, earnings before taxes and loan 
loss provisions deflated by total assets, is used to proxy for banks’ real earnings in the 
model.  In addition, I included another variable (LOSS), the negative earnings before 
taxes and loan loss provisions to examine whether bank managers behave differently 
when there is a loss.   
EBTPLLREARCTCTCTDLLP 543210 *221 ββββββ +++++=                             
εβββ ++++ LEVERAGELOSS 876 BIGFIVE                          (1)                                               
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 Also, I include two additional control variables in the research model - 
LEVERAGE and BIGFIVE. Prior studies show that discretionary accruals are 
generally associated with leverage levels (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; DeAngelo, H., 
Discretionary loan loss provisions; 
Ratio of Tier I capital (before loan loss provisions) to risk-
weighted total assets; 
Ratio of Tier II capital (before loan loss provisions) to risk-
weighted total assets; 
Ratio of Loan loss reserves (before loan loss provisions) to risk-
weighted total assets; 
Earnings management incentive dummy variables: NEG or 
DECRE;  
Dummy variable, equals to one if there is a loss in a bank;  
Dummy variable, equals to one if there is an earnings decrease 
from the previous year;  
Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions/average total assets 
Negative earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions/average 
total assets; 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the sample firm is audited by one 
of the five auditing firms: Arthur Andersen (AA), Deloitee & 
Touché (D&T), Ernst & Young (E&Y), KPMG (KPMG), or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC); 
Ratio of total liability to average total assets; 
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L. DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1994; Becker et al., 1998). It is important to control the 
relationship between leverage and loan loss provisions as the leverage level is an 
important bank performance indictor.  
The loan loss provisioning differences among banks with Big 5 and non-Big 5 
auditors are also examined by including the BIGFIVE variable. It is interesting to 
investigate this issue in banks. Researchers generally believe that Big 5 auditors have 
high financial reporting quality. They are more conservative because of the higher 
litigation risks and adverse reputation effect they may face if they get caught by 
supporting and/ or failing to report detected misbehaviors in clients’ financial reports. 
Comparing to non-Big 5 auditors, they have “more to lose” (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Reynolds and Francis, 2001). However, they may also have “more to gain” in the 
same time in banking industry. Banks managers can simultaneously manipulate both 
earnings and regulatory capital upward by reducing loan loss provisions under the 
Basel Accord. This incremental benefit of loan loss provision manipulation may give 
bank managers stronger incentives to “bribe” auditors by providing “bigger rent”.  
 
4.2. Firm-specific characteristics variables 
 
Cross-sectional variations of capital management mechanisms across different 
banks are tested by allowing interactions between regulatory capital and three firm-
specific characteristics. The differences in banks’ firm-specific characteristics are 
proxied by three dummy variables, HNAF, VAR and SIZE. HNAF equals to one if a 
bank’s nonaudit fee ratio (the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees) is above the sample 
mean, and zero otherwise. VAR describes the difference in nonaudit service purchase 
pattern (variability) across banks. It equals to one if the standard deviation of a bank’s 
nonaudit fee ratios is below the sample mean. I also use an alternative VAR measure 
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for robustness check - the rank of standard deviation of nonaudit fee ratios. It equals 
to one if it is in the highest rank decile in the sample, and 10 if it is in the lowest rank 
decile. Size effect on capital management is examined through SIZE dummy, which 
equals to one if a bank’s total asset is below the sample mean level. The interaction 
terms between regulatory capital and each of these dummy variables are added into 
the basic model. Formula (2) is an illustration of the regression of cross-sectional 
variations of capital management mechanisms across different banks by using HNAF 
as a demonstration. 
      LOSSEBTPLLREARCTCTCTDLLP
6543210
*221 βββββββ ++++++=                     
HNAFEBTPHNAFLLRHNAFCTHNAFCT ***2*1 10987 ββββ ++++
 εβββ ++++ LEVERAGEHNAFLOSS 131211 BIGFIVE*                       (2)                            
 
4.3. Estimation of discretionary loan loss provisions 
 
 I use discretionary loan loss provisions as the dependent variable to examine the 
financial reporting quality in the banking industry. Comparing to other financial 
reporting quality measures in non-banking industries, loan loss provisions can detect 
discretionary behaviors more effectively. Loan loss provisions better satisfy two 
critical criteria of a good manipulation detection tool. First, loan loss provisions are 
very sensitive to both capital and earnings management incentives. As demonstrated 
in chapter 3, loan loss provisions are linked to regulatory capital and earnings by 
construction. Second, nondiscretionary portion of loan loss provisions can be better 
isolated from the discretionary portion comparing to other accruals detection models. 
Nondiscretionary loan loss provisions can be developed fairly reliably. Researchers 
can rely on the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to understand what 
fundamentals should be reflected in the loan loss provisions in absence of 
management manipulations. Following Beatty et al. (2002), I analyze the 
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nondiscretionary loan loss provisions based on a series of loan portfolio characteristic 
variables identified under the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP):    
ititititititit LOANCLOANRLLRNPLLASSETLLP 43210 βββββα +++∆++=  





             






Nondiscretionary loan loss provisions are generally evaluated based on the credit risk 
assessment and loan loss possibilities. The complete series of loan portfolio variables 
in formula (3) fairly reflect credit risk associated with loan portfolios. Size effect, 
regional effect and specific function of different loan categories are also fully 
controlled in the regression. Residuals from the regression discretionary loan loss 
provisions in this study. 
 
4.4.  Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
 I use a sample of bank holdings firms with annual observations from year 2000 to 
year 2005. All sample banks have SIC code of 6021 or 6022. In addition, to be 
included in the study, a bank must satisfy the following requirements:   
• has fiscal year-end of December 31  
• has at least four years of consecutive data. 
• with total asset above $500 million 
    LLP        =   
NPL∆      = 
   
    LASSET   =   
    L L R    =   
 
LOANR   =   
LOANC     =   
LOAND  =   
LOANA    =   
 
LOANI    =   
LOANF    =   
Loan loss provisions deflated by the average loans; 
Change in nonperforming loans deflated by the average of 
beginning and ending total loans; 
Natural log of total asset; 
Loan loss reserves deflated by the total loans at the 
beginning of the year; 
Loans secured by real estate deflated by total loans; 
Commercial and industrial loans deflated by total loans; 
Loans to depository institutions deflated by total loans; 
Loans to finance agricultural production deflated by total 
loans; 
Loans to individuals deflated by total loans; 
Loans to foreign government deflated by total loans 
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• loan portfolio variables needed to calculate discretionary loan loss 
provisions are  available from Y-9C in CFRB of FRBC16 
• DEF 14A proxy statement for audit fees matrix data and 10-k report for 
non-performing loan data are available from EDGAR17 
• control variables data available from Compustat 
 
Gunther and Moore (2003) investigate mandated loan loss provision revision 
instances. They report that all banks (except six banks) with mandated revisions are 
small banks with total assets less than $500 million. In order to make sure all bank 
managers in my sample are tacitly allowed by regulators to excise judgments on loan 
loss provisioning, banks with total assets below $500 million are deleted. I also 
remove banks with merger and acquisition transactions happened during the sample 
period. Merger and acquisition transactions demand considerable extra audit and 
nonaudit services besides those generated from normal operations. The above 
selection process leaves 1609 bank-year observations from year 2001 to 2005 in my 
sample. One year data is lost due to the necessary differencing process in the 
estimation of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions.  
Table 4.1 presents sample descriptive statistics. Banks in this sample are generally 
well-capitalized. The average T1C is 12.43%, higher than the 4% minimum level 
required by the Basel Accord. In contrast, T2C is relatively low with a mean of 1.26%. 
This is not surprising because Tier I capital is the dominant regulatory capital 
component which can be used to absorb the losses without ceasing a bank’s existence. 
It is the major indicator of a bank’s capital adequacy. The average ratio of loan loss 
reserves to beginning total loan is 1.15%. The mean ratio of EBTP is 6.9% and the 
mean return on asset (ROA) is 1.1%. These are consistent with what observed in prior 
                                                 
16 Federal Reserve Bank website of Chicago. 
17 EDGAR: SEC Filings and Forms. 
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studies. Loans are major bank assets. Untabulated table shows that the mean (median) 
of total loan to total asset ratios is 66.28 % (67.45%). This implies that loan loss 
provisions are important bank accruals. As shown in Table 4.1, the mean and median 
ratio of loan loss provisions to average total loans is 0.4 % and 0.3% respectively. 
Ratio of loan loss provisions to earnings (EBTP) is also very high, with a mean of 
15.85 % and median of 11.05%. 
<– Insert Table 4.1 around here –> 
Table 4.2 - 4.4 present the descriptive statistics of nonaudit services and audit 
services. Audit and nonaudit service fee data become available in year 2000. 
According to the Section II.C.5 of SEC rule (2000), firms are required to disclose 
audit fee, financial information system design and implementation fee (IS hereafter)18 
and “all other fees” (audit-related service fee, tax service fee, and other fees). This 
rule narrowly defines nonaudit fee as the sum of IS fee and all other fees. Basically, 
nonaudit fee is generated from all services except 10-Ks audit and 10-Qs review 
services. As shown in Table 4.2, nonaudit fee ratios are significantly lower than audit 
fee ratios. The mean of nonaudit fee ratios is 29.27 % and the median is 26.31%, 
while the mean of audit fee ratios is 70.73 % and median is 73.69%. Nonaudit fee 
ratios are even less than half of audit fee ratios. This differs from what has been 
observed from non-banking industries. Nonaudit service fees are almost 50% of total 
fees in non-banking industries. Frankel et al. (2002) report that the mean of nonaudit 
fee to total fee ratios in their sample is 49%. The percentage of nonaudit fee in total 
fee also has a mean of 47.73% in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) sample. The relatively low 
nonaudit service proportion may be specific to the banking industry. Stringent 
                                                 
18 Required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(July 30, 2002), audit firms are prohibited from providing 
services such as financial information system implementation and design, internal auditing, and a 
number of other services. 
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supervision and monitoring system in this highly regulated banking industry suppress 
excessive nonaudit service purchases.  
Panel B describes fee distributions of three important nonaudit services: audit-
related service, tax service and all other services. Results show that they are evenly 
distributed. The average ratio of each of the three nonaudit service components to 
total services is 10%.  This also seems to be unique to the banking industry. Audit-
related services are far more recurring than the other two engagements in other 
industries. In contrast, banks may have much higher demand for tax services and “all 
other services” than non-banking industries. For example, tax services become 
especially prevalent in recent years. Banks purchase large amount of tax services, 
hoping to save tax expenses via auditors’ professional arrangements. Moreover, banks 
require more consulting services on merger and acquisition transactions or new equity 
issuing which are included in the category of “all other services”.  
<– Insert Table 4.2 around here –> 
I compare audit fees charged by Big 5 auditors and non-Big 5 auditors in Table 
4.3.  The average total fees charged by Big 5 auditors is 2083.18 (all fees are in 
thousands of dollars), much higher than fees charged by non-Big 5 auditors (167.18). 
One explanation is that most of the clients of Big 5 auditors are larger than those of 
non-Big 5 auditors. Besides that, as literature papers documented, Big 5 auditors 
generally charge higher premiums for their recognized industry specializations, high 
audit quality and reputation.  
Average nonaudit fee ratios of banks audited by Big 5 auditors (28.45%) are not 
significantly different from banks audited by non-Big 5 auditors (30.04%). 
Nevertheless, the nonaudit fee ratios from both Big 5 auditors and non-Big 5 auditors 
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are much higher than the 10% level reported by SEC rule (2000)19.  This implies that 
the high level of nonaudit service provision may pose potential threats to auditor 
independence and financial reporting quality in the banking industry. 
<– Insert Table 4.3 around here –> 
                 <– Insert Table 4.4 around here –> 
 
  I did trend analysis on audit fees, audit fee ratios, nonaudit fees and nonaudit fee 
ratios, aiming to see if there is any significant distribution pattern over years. Audit 
fees and nonaudit fees have never been examined in a time-series manner in literature 
before. We can observe from Table 4.4 that nonaudit service fees and nonaudit fee 
ratios continuously shrink from year 2001 to year 2005, and the decrease becomes 
substantial starting from year 2003. Banks audited by Big 5 auditors and non-Big 5 
auditors all have the same nonaudit -service -fee-declining pattern.  
Strict regulatory rules on nonaudit services enacted since 2000 may cause the 
decrease of nonaudit services. SEC rule (2000) requires stringent scrutiny on both the 
supply and disclosure of nonaudit services. Together with other legislative rules, SEC 
rule (2000) calls for public concerns of auditor independence and accounting 
reporting quality. As a consequence, market investors react negatively to firms with 
high nonaudit fees when they perceive the nonaudit service fees as representation of 
dishonesty and low audit quality (Francis, 2006). Therefore, heavy purchase of 
nonaudit services during this regulating period would not only pose higher litigation 
risk on auditors, but also trigger negative stock market reactions to audited banks.  
 
 
                                                 
19 In SEC (2000) report, the 1999 data shows that non-audit fee is only 10% of total fee, and only 75% 
of firms purchase non-audit service. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of 1609 bank holding firm-year observations over 
the year 2001 to year 2005. All banks 1) file Y-9C reports with the Federal Reserve 
and 2) disclose audit and non-audit fee data in EDGER.  
 
Variables TIC, T2C and LLR are used to capture the capital management incentives 
of bank managers; EBTP is used as a proxy for the earnings management incentive. In 
order to fairly reflect credit risk assessment and loan valuations related to the 
nondiscretionary portion of loan loss provisions, a series of loan portfolio 
characteristic variables identified under the generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP)  are used: NPL, LLR, LOANR, LOANC, LOAND, LOANA, LOANI, and 
LOANF. These variables effectively control region effect and loans’ specific function. 
Size effect is controlled by the natural log of total asset, LASSET.ASSET is the total 
assets of bank firms at year end, and is dollar amount in millions.  
 
Variable Mean STD Min 25% Median 75% Max 
        
LLP   0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.062 
TIC 12.429 3.35 5.386 10.488 11.826 13.484 46.401
T2C 1.260 1.020 0.314 0.753 0.969 1.296 9.849 
LLR 0.011 0.035 -0.024 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.895 
EBTP 0.069 0.767 -14.041 0 0.091 0.19 19.745
LEVERAGE 1.036 2.388 0.017 0.897 0.908 0.919 49.928
NAF 0.293 0.183 0 0.156 0.263 0.401 0.936 
 
 0.000 0.005 -0.031 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.032 
LASSET 14.200 1.575 12.040 13.118 13.729 14.891 21.125
LLR 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.059 
LOANR 0.719 0.143 0.000 0.635 0.742 0.816 0.999 
LOANC  0.165 0.100 0.000 0.097 0.141 0.207 0.724 
LOAND 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.396 
LOANA 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.339 
LOANI 0.084 0.083 0.000 0.030 0.062 0.107 0.960 
LOANF 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
STD(NAF) 0.129 0.07 0 0.075 0.118 0.178 0.363 

















Loan loss provision deflated by the average loans  
Ratio of Tier I capital before loan loss reserves to the risk-
weighted total assets 
Ratio of Tier II capital before reserves to the risk-weighted total 
assets 
Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves before loan loss provisions to the 
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Earnings before taxes and loan loss provision deflated by the 
average total assets 
Ratio of total liability to average total assets 
Non-audit service fee to total fee ratio, non-audit service fee is 
the sum of audit-related fee, tax fees, other advisory fees, IS 
and all other fees  
Change in nonperforming loans deflated by the average of 
beginning and ending total loans 
Natural log of total asset 
Loan loss reserve deflated by the total loans at the beginning 
of the year 
Loans secured by real estate as a percentage of total loans 
Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to depository institutions as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to finance agricultural production as a percentage of 
total loans 
Loans to individuals as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to foreign government as a percentage of total loans 
Standard deviation of non-audit service fee ratio for each bank 
firm 
Net income divided by average total asset 
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TABLE 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Auditor Fees Disclosed in Proxy Statements in Banking Holdings Companies (2001-2005) 
 
   Standard First  Third   
Variable Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile Minimum Maximum 
        
Panel A: Mandatory Disclosure of Fee Data      
Audit 665.20 2916.91 75.50 135.20 345.40 0.07 55000.00 
Audit/Total 70.73% 18.32% 59.94% 73.69% 84.37% 6.36% 100.00% 
        
Nonaudit 487.96 2521.77 22.00 49.47 131.18 0.00 58700.00 
Nonaudit/Total 29.27% 18.32% 15.63% 26.31% 40.06% 0.00% 93.64% 
        
IS 1.00 37.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1491.00 
IS/Total 0.07% 1.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 43.60% 
        
Total Fees 1153.17 5030.73 110.59 202.96 521.18 0.09 74200.00 
        
Panel B: Voluntary Disclosure of Fee Data      
Audit-Related  215.89 878.19 10.64 23.50 62.73 0.00 9900.00 
Audit-Related/Total 9.50% 11.15% 0.00% 6.30% 14.20% 0.00% 72.37% 
        
Tax  271.25 1393.00 9.00 20.78 66.75 0.00 15300.00 
Tax/Total 10.10% 10.91% 0.00% 7.56% 14.31% 0.00% 74.77% 
        
All Other  240.74 1767.31 6.22 23.79 73.40 0.00 35300.00 
All Other/Total 9.59% 16.88% 0.00% 0.05% 12.25% 0.00% 93.64% 
Note: Panel A presents the distribution of mandatory disclosure by SEC rule (2000), Section II. The components of nonaudit fees are described in 
Panel B: audit-related fees, tax fees, the financial information system design and implementation fees (IS) and all other Advisory fees. All other 
advisory service is general consulting service, and information technology consulting for systems not associated with the financial statements. All 





Descriptive Statistics of Fees Disclosed by Big 5 and non-Big 5 Auditors (2001-2005) 
 
                
Panel A: Big 5 Auditors, Fees are divided by Total Auditor Fees    
  Standard First  Third   
Variable Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile Minimum Maximum 
        
Total Fees 2083.18 6884.56 206.04 466.23 1023.65 41.00 74200.00 
Audit/Total 69.96% 20.22% 58.34% 73.68% 85.86% 6.36% 100.00% 
NonAudit/Total 30.04% 20.22% 14.14% 26.32% 41.66% 0.00% 93.64% 
IS/Total 0.08% 1.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 43.60% 
Audit-Related/Total 9.04% 11.03% 0.00% 5.40% 13.44% 0.00% 72.37% 
Tax/Total 11.48% 13.23% 0.00% 7.46% 17.77% 0.00% 74.77% 
All Other/Total 9.44% 17.99% 0.00% 0.00% 9.97% 0.00% 93.64% 
        
Panel B: Non- Big 5  Auditors, Fees are divided by Total Auditor Fees    
  Standard First  Third   
Variable Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile Minimum Maximum 
        
Total Fees 167.18 170.90 81.57 119.17 191.15 0.09 2049.08 
Audit/Total 71.55% 16.05% 61.91% 73.79% 83.69% 15.57% 100.00% 
NonAudit/Total 28.45% 16.05% 16.31% 26.21% 38.09% 0.00% 84.43% 
IS/Total 0.07% 1.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 26.77% 
Audit-Related/Total 9.99% 11.26% 0.00% 7.20% 15.37% 0.00% 67.86% 
Tax/Total 8.64% 7.45% 3.27% 7.61% 12.24% 0.00% 43.44% 
All Other/Total 9.75% 15.63% 0.00% 0.85% 13.40% 0.00% 81.58% 
 
Note: Big 5 Auditors are Arthur Andersen  (AA),  Deloitee & Touché (D&T), Ernst & Young (E&Y), KPMG (KPMG), and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC). The auditors included in the category of " non-Big 5 Auditors " with observations exceed 50 are as follows: Beard Miller Company LLP, 





Time-Series Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Fees and Ratios (2001-2005) 
 
This table presents the median of audit fees, nonaudit fees, total fees, audit ratio and nonaudit fee ratios for 1609 bank holding firm-year 
observations from year 2001 to year 2005. Panel A.B and Panel C report the medians of full sample, Big 5 sample and non-Big 5 sample 
respectively. All fees are in thousands of dollars. 
 
Year Audit  fee NonAudit  Fee Total  Fees Audit Fee ratio 
NonAudit  Fee 
Ratio 
Panel A: Full Sample      
2001 98.90 58.00 171.00 62.72% 37.28% 
2002 100.00 52.02 159.45 67.43% 32.57% 
2003 116.35 47.21 176.09 71.31% 28.69% 
2004 208.12 45.29 269.65 79.85% 20.15% 
2005 215.00 46.90 290.50 81.65% 18.35% 
      
Panel B: Big 5 Sample      
2001 188.00 131.41 308.03 58.43% 41.57% 
2002 205.00 110.00 320.06 65.26% 34.74% 
2003 256.13 98.97 332.98 71.24% 28.76% 
2004 519.17 102.79 608.78 82.69% 17.31% 
2005 529.30 90.25 647.00 83.96% 16.04% 
      
Panel C: Non-Big 5 Sample      
2001 62.67 35.46 102.54 66.79% 33.21% 
2002 71.80 32.01 107.29 68.74% 31.26% 
2003 72.55 31.00 107.50 70.52% 29.48% 
2004 100.41 31.95 135.64 77.20% 22.80% 




Regulatory Capital Adjustment 
 
Following Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahemad et al. (1999), I use Tier I and Tier II 
capitals are adjusted for loan loss provisions. The regulatory capital available in 
databases is reported regulatory capital, which could be contaminated by possible 
manipulations via loan loss provisions. Hence adjustments are necessary to avoid the 
mechanical link between dependent variable and regulatory capital. However, I make the 
adjustments differently. I begin with reported capital in Y9-C report (Consolidated 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C) instead of the capital 
ratios as done by Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahemad et al. (1999).  
Adjusted Tier I capital ratio= [reported Tier I capital (BHCK8274) + (1-T)* LLP 
(BHCK 4230)]/total risk-weighted assets  
Adjusted Tier II capital ratio= [reported Tier II capital (BHCK8275)- 
LLR(BHCK5310)]/ total risk-weighted assets  
Where T is the tax rate, and BHCK is the code used in Y9-C report. 
 In this capital ratios adjustment, two issues need special mention. Firstly, Y9-C does 
not report the tax rate for each bank in each specific fiscal year, only the total tax expense 
is reported. For calculation, I follow the recommendation by Kim and Kross (1998) and 
assume a universal tax rate of 34%. To obtain fairly accurate representation, I plan to use 
income before tax and extraordinary items (BHCK4301) and applicable income tax 
(BHCK4301) in Y9-C report to calculate the yearly tax rate for each bank. However, I 
expect the result to be similar.  
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Secondly, according to the Basel Accord, banks can choose to deduct the amount loan 
loss reserves exceeding 1.25% of risk –weighted assets from the total risk-weighted 
assets when calculate Tier I or Tier II capital ratios. Bank managers can inflate capital 
ratios by reducing the ratio denominators through this. However, total risk-weighted 
assets are reported by bank managers, and they are not specified in Y9-C report whether 
these numbers are before or after the loan loss reserve deduction. In order to get the real 
capital ratio, adjustments should be done for banks with loan loss reserves larger than 
1.25% of risk-weighted assets.  However, after careful scrutinizing the pilot sample, I 
find loan loss reserves (before loan loss provisions) are mostly lower than the upper limit, 




































     
Chapter 5 is organized as follows. This chapter starts with results on capital 
management tests in section 5.1. Empirical results of capital management mechanisms of 
both Tier I capital and Tier II capital via loan loss provisions are consistent with the 
hypotheses. Section 5.2 shows bank mangers’ response to the situation where earnings 
management incentive conflicts with Tier II capital management purpose. Section 5.3 
presents the impact of both nonaudit service fee level and variability on capital 
management incentives, followed by the evidence of size effect in section 54.  Lastly, 
section 5.5 describes the interactive effect of three firm-specific characteristics on capital 
management incentives. 
 
5.1. Evidence on capital management 
 
I test the capital management hypotheses in the basic model and present results in 
Table 5.1.  The associations between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions differ 
significantly from what we have observed from prior studies. Coefficient of TIC is 
significantly positive (0.0003, two-tailed p-value 0.00). This is consistent with my 
hypothesis that Tier I capital is positively related to loan loss provisions, that is, lower 
Tier I capital is associated with lower loan loss provisions. Because loan loss reserves are 
removed from Tier I capital, the net effect of loan loss provisions on Tier I capital is the 
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negative tax shield. Banks with lower Tier I capital are likely to increase Tier I capital by 
reducing loan loss provisions (instead of increasing as they did before the Basel Accord 
implementation). This finding is indirectly supported by two prior studies. Although there 
is no direct evidence of positive association between Tier I capital and loan loss 
provisions, Ahemad et al. (1999) report that the association between regulatory capital 
and loan loss provisions has become less negative since the implementation of Basel 
Accord. Kim and Kross (1998) also compare the capital management behaviors before 
and after the Basel Accord. They show that banks with low capital ratios in the 1990 to 
1992 (the Basel regime) sample generally have less loan loss provisions than banks in the 
1985 to 1988 (the prior-Basel regime) sample. Besides the empirical evidences, my 
finding is also consistent with industry practice. There are quite many well-known bank 
loan loss under-provisioning cases happened worldwide, for example, in French Credit 
Lyonnais in 1993, Thailand in 1997, Japan in late 1990’s (Genay, 1998), and more 
recently, China.  
Table 5.1 also reveals the association between Tier II capital and loan loss provisions. 
Tier II capital has become an alternative capital management option in addition to Tier I 
capital because the Basel Accord allows loan loss reserves to be included in Tier II 
capital. As hypothesized, loan loss provisions affect Tier II capital positively through the 
included loan loss reserves. This is proved in Table 5.1. The coefficient of T2C is 
significantly negative (-0.0002, two-tailed p-value, 0.00), implying that banks can choose 
to inflate Tier II capital by increasing loan loss provisions. The association between loan 
loss reserves and loan loss provisions is also examined in Table 5.1. LLR has a negative 
coefficient, significant at 5% level (-0.0101, two-tailed p-value, 0.00). This finding 
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suggests that, because loan loss reserves includable in total capital is limited to 1.25% of 
risk-weighted total assets, banks with less loan loss reserves can better maximize the 
capital management benefits comparing to banks with high level of loan loss reserves, 
therefore they are more likely to engage in loan loss provision manipulations. 
<– Insert Table 5.1 around here –> 
  Table 5.1 reports the loan loss provisioning differences among banks audited by Big 
5 auditors and non-Big 5 auditors. Coefficient of BIGFIVE is significantly negative (-
0.0004, two-tailed p-value, 0.01). That is, banks audited by Big 5 auditors have less 
discretionary loan loss provisions than banks audited by their non-Big 5 auditors. This 
finding is consistent with literature evidences. Becker et al. (1998) and Francis, Maydew 
and Sparks (1999) find that Big 5 auditors usually report lower level of discretionary 
accruals than non-Big 5 auditors. Also, Gore, Pope and Singh (2001) study the 
associations between several earnings quality proxies and nonaudit service fees. They 
directly show that non-Big 5 auditors are more acquiescent to clients’ earnings 
management behaviors. In contrast, they do not find any significant relationship between 
discretionary earnings and nonaudit fees in firms audited by Big 5 auditors. This can be 
explained by higher litigation risk and adverse reputation cost Big 5 auditors face. The 
explanation is that generally Big 5 auditors have substantial number of clients thus they 
have “more to lose” if they get caught by supporting and/ or failing to report detected 
misbehaviors in clients’ financial reports (DeAngelo, 1981; Reynolds and Francis, 2001). 
As for leverage level, different from prior studies (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
DeAngelo et al., 1994; Becker et al., 1998), the coefficient of LEVERAGE is 
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insignificant. Leverage does not  have much explanatory power to discretionary loan loss 
provisions in my sample. 
 
5.2. Conflicts between earnings and Tier II capital 
 
   Because loan loss provisions are by nature, mechanically associated with earnings, I 
control earnings management incentive via EBTP (earnings before tax and loan loss 
provisions) in the basic model. The coefficient estimate of EBTP is significantly positive 
in table 5.1 (0.0003, two-tailed p-value, 0.01). Because loan loss provisions are expenses 
set aside for doubtful loans, loan loss provisions effectively decrease net income after tax. 
Bank managers thus can decrease loan loss provisions when real earnings is low, and 
inflate loan loss provisions to reserve earnings for a “better tomorrow” when real 
earnings is far above or below earnings targets.  
As shown in table 5.1, LOSS, lacks explanatory power in the test.  Insufficient banks 
with negative earnings data in my sample can explain the insignificant coefficient of 
LOSS.  Differs from non-banking firms, banks are generally less likely to have negative 
earnings under normal circumstances. I carefully scrutinized my sample and found very 
few banks with losses indeed. Also because of the loss data insufficiency, untabulated 
tables show the interaction term between Tier II capital and one of the earnings 
management incentive proxies, T2C*NEG (NEG equals to one if there is a loss in the 
bank) is not significant.  
Evidence of the conflicting effect between Tier II capital and another earnings 
management proxy, DECRE, is presented in Table 5.1. DECRE equals to one if there is 
an earnings decrease from the previous year in a bank. Opposite to the negative sign of 
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T2C coefficient, T2C*DECRE estimate has a significantly positive sign (0.8173, two-
tailed p-value, 0.00). That is, among banks with the same level of Tier II capital, those 
banks that experience earnings decreases from the previous year would prefer to 
manipulate earnings upward via loan loss provisions reduction. This is consistent with 
Betty et al (2002). They show that public banks use loan loss provisions to eliminate 
small earnings decreases. Earnings from the previous year is not only a very important 
earnings target banks need to beat, many literature papers also demonstrate that banks can 
enjoy many incremental benefits from consistent earnings increase. After controlling 
earnings levels, Barth et al. (1995) report that firms with consistent earnings increases 
usually have higher price-to-earnings ratios, and this market premium goes larger when 
the string of earnings-increase goes longer. DeAngelo et al. (1996) even quantify the 
market premium brought by consistent earnings increases. They show that firms can 
suffer from an average of 14% negative abnormal stock return in the year when the 
consistent earnings growth pattern is broken.  
   
5.3. Evidence on nonaudit services  
 
  Table 5.2 presents the variations of capital management mechanisms across banks 
with different level of nonaudit fees. The coefficient of T1C*HNAF is positive (0.0002, 
two-tailed p-value 0.01), and the coefficient of T2C*HNAF is negative (-0.0003, two-
tailed p-value 0.02). The signs are in the same directions as the estimates of TIC and T2C 
in Table 5.1, and both are statistically significant at 5% level. That is, high level of 
nonaudit service fee ratios strengthens the associations between regulatory capital and 
loan loss provisions. Comparing to banks of low level of nonaudit service fee ratios, 
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banks with more nonaudit service purchases are more likely to decrease loan loss 
provisions to boost up Tier I capital, and increase loan loss provisions if they want to 
manipulate Tier II capital upward. These uncovered differences in the associations 
between regulatory capital and discretionary loan loss provisions among banks with 
various nonaudit fee levels could be explained in two ways. One possibility is that a bank 
purchases large amount of nonaudit services from its incumbent auditor to meet its real 
operation needs. The purchased nonaudit services thus tight up the economic bond 
between the bank and its auditor which encourages the bank to engage in manipulative 
actions subsequently. The story could go the other way round. In anticipating the 
manipulation needs in the next period, bank managers deliberately provide rent to 
auditors by purchasing large amount of nonaudit services, hoping to get auditors’ support 
or acquiescence to its planned manipulative actions.  
<– Insert Table 5.2 around here –> 
  Besides nonaudit fee level, the variability of nonaudit service fee is also expected to 
significantly affect banks’ discretionary behaviors. Banks that consume nonaudit services 
regularly and consistently should have different manipulation incentives from those 
banks with sparse and irregular nonaudit service purchases. Two different variability 
(VAR) measures are tested in Table 5.3. In model (1), VAR is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 if the standard deviation of a bank’s nonaudit service fee ratios is lower than 
the median standard deviation of the sample. In model (2), VAR is defined based on the 
rank of standard deviations. It equals to 1 if the standard deviation of the nonaudit service 
fee ratios is in the highest rank decile, and 10 if it is in the lowest rank decile in the 
sample. 
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As shown in Table 5.3, the coefficient estimates of T1C*VAR in both models are 
negative (-0.0002 with two-tailed p-value of 0.01 in model (1), and -0.0001with two-
tailed p-value of 0.00 in model (2)). In contrast, coefficient estimates of T2C*VAR are 
significantly positive in both models. It is 0.0005 in model (1) and 0.001 in model (2). 
The signs of both T1C*VAR and T2C*VAR are opposite to signs of T1C and T2C. The 
real earnings proxy, EBTP, has the same change. In contrast to the positive sign of EBTP 
in Table 5.1, coefficient of EBTP*VAR is significantly negative (-0.0007 with two-tailed 
p-value of 0.01 in model (1), and -0.0001 with two-tailed p-value of 0.02 in model (2)). 
The sign changes suggest that consistent and regular nonaudit service purchases not only 
weaken the associations between loan loss provisions and regulatory capital, but also the 
link between loan loss provisions and earnings. In particular, banks with low variability 
of nonaudit service purchases are less likely to manipulate regulatory capital and earnings 
via exercising discretions on loan loss provisions.  
  My results show that low variability of nonaudit services purchases suppresses 
banks’ manipulation incentives. This interesting finding provides researchers valuable 
reference on understanding how banks react to SEC regulations on nonaudit services 
starting from year 2000, e.g. the SEC Final Rule (2000) and Sarbanes-Oxely Act of  2002. 
These regulations aim to intervene and regulate both the supply and disclosure of 
nonaudit services. Both banks and auditors become cautious and conservative in reaction 
to these stringent regulations. Because regular and consistent nonaudit service purchases 
can be considered as obvious symptoms of managerial manipulation intentions, banks 
buy nonaudit services in this manner can easily draw considerable attentions from 
regulatory institutions within this regulating period. This poses pose high litigation risk 
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on auditors as a consequence. Consistent and regular purchases of nonaudit services also 
would cause negative market reactions to audited banks if market investors “perceive” 
that as a sign of dishonesty or low audit quality. 
<– Insert Table 5.3 around here –> 
This study examines the impact of nonaudit services on the association between 
regulatory capital and loan loss provisions. However, it does not attempt to investigate 
whether auditor independence is actually impaired or not. This stand-alone marginal 
analysis does not infer much about factual independence impairments because auditor 
independence is not readily observable with real data. I examine the variations of the 
relation between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions across banks with different 
nonaudit service fee level and variability, but I can not empirically verify or confirm that 
auditors deliberately support or acquiesce to banks’ manipulations for the sake of 
nonaudit service income. Advanced and rigorous models which can probe subjective 
issues are needed. However, my results provide meaningful implications for further 
researches on the auditor independence issue in the future. 
5.4. Evidence on size effect  
 
      Bank size considerably affects banks’ regulatory capital management incentives. As 
shown in Table 5.4, the coefficient of T1C*SIZE is significantly positive (0.0004, two-
tailed p-value 0.00), suggesting that small banks generally have stronger association 
between Tier I capital and loan loss provisions. That is, comparing to big banks, they are 
more likely to decrease loan loss provisions if they have to report higher Tier I capital.  
Small-size banks also have reinforced Tier II capital manipulation incentive. As verified 
by the significantly negative coefficient of T2C*SIZE (-0.0013, two-tailed p-value 0.00), 
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small banks have higher incentive to increase Tier II capital via boosting up loan loss 
provisions.  
<– Insert Table 5.4 around here –> 
The size effect on discretionary loan loss provisions and regulatory capital can be 
explained by two reasons. First, small banks have higher manipulation needs. Because of 
insufficient diversification, small production scale and high production cost, small banks 
suffer from higher performance volatility in comparison with large banks. They thus have 
higher manipulation demand to achieve smooth and steady reported earnings and 
regulatory capital. Second, their unsophisticated internal control systems and incompetent 
internal auditing enable them to benefit from lower detection risk of their misbehaviors, 
which eventually encourage them to involve in manipulations. In comparison, large 
banks generally have lower capital manipulation incentives. High litigation risk and high 
reputation cost can restrain them away from discretionary behaviors (Kellogg, 1984; 
Stice, 1991; Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998). On the other hand, large banks usually 
possess large bargaining power which reduces their manipulation incentives. Stinson 
(1993) and Bishop (1996) argue that big banks can continuously violating capital 
requirements without regulatory intervention because they are “too big to fail”. 
 
5.4. Interactions between three bank-specific characteristics  
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 present the interactive effects between HNAF and VAR, and 
HNAF and SIZE respectively. The previous results show that banks with low variability 
of nonaudit services generally have weaker association between regulatory capital and 
loan loss provisions. However, this variability measure only evaluates the nonaudit 
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service purchase frequency. It does not take the purchase magnitude into consideration. It 
is possible that two banks with the same purchase frequency can differ considerably in 
nonaudit service fee magnitude. In order to differentiate banks with different nonaudit 
service fee magnitudes and same level of purchase frequency, I add HNAF into the 
model to interact with VAR. As shown in Table 5.5, the coefficient of TIC*VAR*HNAF 
is significant (0.0004, two-tailed p-value 0.00) with the same positive sign as T1C. 
However, it is opposite to the negative sign of TIC*VAR. T2C*VAR*HNAF (-0.0006, 
two-tailed p-value 0.00) follows the same pattern. Its sign is the same as T2C and is 
opposite to the sign of T2C*VAR. These findings suggest that it is the magnitude of 
nonaudit service fee dominates banks’ capital management incentives among banks of 
same low nonaudit service fee variability. In other words, if there are two banks who 
purchase nonaudit service in the same manner (regularly and consistently), the bank who 
purchases nonaudit service in a larger magnitude is more likely to have stronger 
association between regulatory capital and discretionary loan loss provisions.  
<– Insert Table 5.5 around here –> 
       <– Insert Table 5.6 around here –> 
 
The interaction between nonaudit service fee level and bank size is also investigated.  
Table 5.6 presents the results. Although the coefficient of T1C*HNAF*SIZE is not 
significant, it has the same positive sign as T1C*HNAF. T2C*HNAF*SIZE also has the 
same negative coefficient (-0.0007, two-tailed p-value 0.01) as T2C*HNAF, and it is 
statistically significant at 5% level. We can infer from the results that, among banks with 
the same high level of nonaudit service fees, small banks are more likely to have strong 
relationship between regulatory capital and loan loss provisions. In particular, small 
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banks with high level of nonaudit service fee ratios prone to boost up Tier I capital by 
decreasing loan loss provisions and manipulate Tier II capital upward by increasing loan 






























Capital Management Hypothesis Test under the Basel Accord   
 (Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
 
This table presents evidence of new relationship between banks’ capital and loan loss 
provisions under the Basel Accord. The dependent variable is loan loss provision. Results 
show, instead of the positive effect in the old capital requirement regime, loan loss 
provisions have negative impact on Tier I capital. This suggests that banks would lower 
loan loss provision if they would like to increase Tier I capital. On the contrary, loan loss 
provisions increase Tier II capital, that is, bank managers would increase loan loss 
provisions to inflate Tier II capital, and this incentive would be stronger when the ratio of 
loan loss reserves to risk-weighted total assets is low. Further more, Tier II capital 
management incentive would be weak if banks experience earnings decrease, as shown 
by the interaction term T2C* DECRE. Earnings management incentive dominates when a 
bank’s earning decreases compared to its last year earnings and bank managers would 
decrease loan loss provisions accordingly under this circumstance.        
              
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0006 0.02 
TIC 0.0003 0.00 
T2C -0.0002 0.00 
T2C*DECRE 0.8173 0.00 
LLR -0.0101 0.00 
EBTP 0.0003 0.01 
LOSS -0.0001 0.47 
BIGFIVE -0.0004 0.01 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.58 
   
R-square 3.55%  
Adjusted R-square 3.07%  
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    T1C               
    
    T2C               
    
LLR   
                  
EBTP   
DECRE         
     
LOSS   
                      
BIGFIVE 
                    
     
   LEVERAG     
Discretionary loan loss provisions from Beatty et al (2002) model  
Ratio of Tier I capital before loan loss provision to risk-weighted total 
assets 
Ratio of Tier II capital before loan loss provision to risk-weighted total 
assets 
Ratio of Loan Loss Reserve before loan loss provision to risk-
weighted total assets  
Earnings before taxes and loan loss provision/average total assets 
Dummy variable, equals to one if there is earnings decrease from the 
previous year 
Negative earnings before taxes and loan loss provision/average total 
assets 
Dummy variable, equals to one if the sample firm is audited by Arthur 
Andersen (AA), Deloitee & Touché (D&T), Ernst & Young (E&Y), 
KPMG (KPMG), or PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). 




 Evidence of Capital Management Mechanisms under the Basel Accord, Conditional 
on the Level of Nonaudit Service Fee (Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
This table presents the variations of capital management behaviors as a function of non-
audit service fee ratios. HNAF is a dummy variable, which equals to one if the nonaudit 
service fee ratio of a bank is higher than the sample median level. Results show that the 
capital management differs among banks with different levels of nonaudit service fee 
ratios. Specifically, banks which purchase large amount of nonaudit services have 
stronger association between LLP and regulatory capital（T1C, T2C）, and both are in 
the expected directions. This indicates that, banks’ providing rents to auditors via 
nonauidt services strengthen the economic bond between bank firms and auditors, as a 
result, bank managers are more likely to involve in capital management.  
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0004 0.15 
TIC 0.0002 0.05 
T2C -0.0001 0.10 
T2C*DECRE 0.8241 0.00 
LLR -0.0143 0.00 
EBTP 0.0001 0.76 
LOSS -0.0003 0.24 
BIGFIVE -0.0004 0.03 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.56 
TIC*HNAF 0.0002 0.01 
T2C*HNAF -0.0003 0.02 
LLR*HNAF 0.0052 0.36 
EBTP*HNAF 0.0003 0.25 
LOSS*HNAF 0.0004 0.34 
   
R-square 0.0461  
Adjusted R-square 0.0383  





Evidence of Banks’ Capital Management Mechanisms under the Basel Accord, 
Conditional on the Variability of Nonaudit Service Fee  
(Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
 
The table presents the impact of variability of nonaudit service fees on banks managers’ 
manipulation incentives via loan loss provisions (LLP). Two different nonaudit fees 
variability measures (VAR) are used. In model (1), VAR is defined as a dummy variable, 
which equals to 1 if the standard deviation of a bank’s non-audit service fee over the 
sample years is lower than the sample median level. In model (2), it is defines by the rank 
of standard deviation, which equals to 1 if the standard deviation of the nonaudit service 




The coefficients of estimators T1C*VAR, T2C* VAR and EBTP*VAR are significant at 
5% level. However, the signs are opposite those of T1C, T2C and EBTP. This finding 
implies that regular and consistent nonaudit service purchases suppress banks’ 
manipulations. This may be explained by the legislative rules which have been enacted to 
regulate nonaudit services supply and disclosures since the beginning of year 
2000.Continuous providing rents to auditors would not only increase detection 
probability and thus pose higher litigation risks to auditors, it also can be perceived as 
impaired honesty and low quality of financial reporting by investors which trigger 




















(Constant) 0.0001 0.78  0.0004 0.23 
TIC 0.0003 0.01  0.0003 0.01 
T2C -0.0006 0.00  -0.0010 0.00 
T2C*DECRE 0.8574 0.00  0.8680 0.00 
LLR -0.0089 0.00  -0.0072 0.04 
EBTP 0.0006 0.00  0.0008 0.00 
LOSS 0.0000 0.99  -0.0001 0.86 
BIGFIVE -0.0005 0.01  -0.0004 0.01 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.53  0.0000 0.48 
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TIC*VAR -0.0002 0.02  -0.0001 0.00 
T2C*VAR 0.0005 0.00  0.0001 0.00 
LLR*VAR -0.0063 0.26  -0.0011 0.17 
EBTP*VAR -0.0007 0.00  -0.0001 0.01 
LOSS*VAR -0.0003 0.52  -0.0002 0.61 
      
R-square 5.21%   5.84%  
Adjusted R-square 4.44%   5.07%  




































Evidence of Size Effect on Banks’ Capital Management Mechanisms under the 
Basel Accord (Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
This table presents evidence of impact of banks firms’ size (total assets) on the banks’ 
capital management behaviors via loan loss provisions under the Basel Accord. Size 
effect is captured by a SIZE dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a bank’s total asset is 
below the sample median level and 0 otherwise.  
 
The coefficients of TIC*SIZE, and T2C*SIZE are statistically significant, indicating that 
size has incremental impact on capital management incentives. Compare to large banks, 
small banks are more likely to be involved in capital management. This can be explained 
in two ways. First, large banks’ manipulation incentives can be constrained by higher 
reputation cost and litigation risk. Second, small banks have higher capital manipulation 
demand, and their inefficient internal control systems can facilitate them to do so with 
lower detection risk is lower.  
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) 0.0002 0.54 
TIC 0.0000 0.97 
T2C 0.0000 0.87 
T2C*DECRE 0.7120 0.00 
LLR -0.0084 0.01 
EBTP 0.0005 0.00 
LOSS 0.0000 0.87 
BIGFIVE -0.0005 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.91 
TIC*SIZE 0.0004 0.00 
T2C*SIZE -0.0013 0.00 
LLR*SIZE -0.0053 0.28 
EBTP*SIZE -0.0003 0.13 
LOSS*SIZE -0.0001 0.72 
   
R-square 4.61%  
Adjusted R-square 3.83%  





Interaction between HNAF and VAR on Banks’ Manipulation incentives Through 
LLP under the Basel Accord (Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
This table presents the incremental effect of HNAF on capital management incentives 
through loan loss provisions the under Basel Accord, when banks have the same level of 
nonaudit service variability (VAR). HNAF is a dummy variable, which equals to one if 
the nonaudit service fee ratio of a bank is higher than the sample median level. VAR is 
also a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the standard deviation of a firm’s nonaudit service 
fee ratio is below sample median level.  
 
The coefficient of TIC*VAR*HNAF, T2C*VAR*HNAF and LLR*VAR*HNAF are 
statistically significant, and their signs are opposite to those of TIC*VAR, T2C*VAR and 
LLR*VAR. However, they are in the same direction as TIC, T2C and LLR. HNAF is 
playing a dominant role. That is, among banks with the same level of nonaudit service 
variability (VAR), those banks with higher level of nonauidt service are more likely to 
manipulate their regulatory capital via loan loss provision. 
 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) 0.0005 0.20 
TIC 0.0002 0.11 
T2C -0.0006 0.00 
T2C*DECRE 0.8814 0.00 
LLR -0.0090 0.00 
EBTP 0.0006 0.00 
LOSS 0.0000 1.00 
BIGFIVE -0.0004 0.02 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.58 
TIC*VAR -0.0003 0.00 
T2C*VAR 0.0007 0.00 
LLR*VAR -0.0003 0.96 
EBTP*VAR -0.0005 0.05 
LOSS*VAR -0.0003 0.48 
TIC*VAR*HNAF 0.0004 0.00 
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T2C*VAR*HNAF -0.0006 0.00 
LLR*VAR*HNAF -0.0603 0.00 
EBTP*VAR*HNAF -0.0004 0.33 
LOSS*VAR*HNAF 0.0003 0.61 
   
R-square 6.82%  
Adjusted R-square 5.77%  





































TABLE  5. 6 
Interaction between HNAF and SIZE on Banks’ Manipulation Incentives through 
LLP under the Basel Accord (Dependent Variable= DLLP, N=1, 609) 
 
This table presents evidence of incremental size effect on the capital management 
incentives of banks with same high level of nonaudit services fees. The coefficient of 
T2C*HNAF*SIZE is negative and significant at 5% level, indicating that smaller banks 
who purchases high level of nonaudit services are more likely to manipulate loan loss 
provisions upward when their Tier II capital are low.  
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0004 0.23 
TIC 0.0002 0.05 
T2C -0.0001 0.10 
T2C*DECRE 0.7131 0.00 
LLR -0.0143 0.00 
EBTP 0.0001 0.72 
LOSS -0.0003 0.25 
BIGFIVE -0.0006 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.83 
TIC*HNAF 0.0003 0.01 
T2C*HNAF -0.0002 0.13 
LLR*HNAF 0.0074 0.20 
EBTP*HNAF 0.0004 0.15 
LOSS*HNAF 0.0008 0.14 
TIC*HNAF*SIZE 0.0001 0.45 
T2C*HNAF*SIZE -0.0007 0.01 
LLR*HNAF*SIZE -0.0114 0.12 
EBTP*HNAF*SIZE -0.0004 0.18 
LOSS*HNAF*SIZE -0.0006 0.32 
   
R-square 5.81%  
Adjusted R-square 4.74%  






                                                                                                                                                                              
SENSTIVITY ANALAYSIS  
 
6.1. Total loan loss provision 
 
I perform a series of additional tests to check the robustness of my results by using 
total loan loss provisions as the dependent variable, instead of the discretionary loan loss 
provisions used in Chapter 5. The association between regulatory capital and total loan 
loss provisions has been tested before in the literature. Kim and Kross (1998) use the 
ratio of total loan loss provisions to total assets as the dependent variable. Similarly, 
Ahmed et al. (1999) examine the association between regulatory capital and the 
percentage of total loan loss provisions to average total loans. However, both of the two 
studies focus only on primary capital and the marginal transitional effect of capital 
regulation changes. Different from my findings, they find that there is no change in this 
association between loan loss provisions and regulatory capital after the change in U.S. 
capital regulations. I replicate my tests by using the total loan loss provisions as the 
dependent variable to see check whether my results are sensitive to the choice of 
dependent variables. 
To test the associations between regulatory capital and total loan loss provisions, I 
incorporate the explanatory variables of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions into the 
right-hand side of the regressions, together with regulatory capital variables and other 
control variables. I construct the model which is shown in formula (4). I made some 
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important improvements on Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed et al. (1999) models.  
Ahmed et al. (1999) use only the change of non-performing loans to proxy the 
nondiscretionary loan loss provisions. Besides non-performing loans, Kim and Kross 
(1998) include one more determinant of loan loss provisions - the gross loan balance. 
Both non-performing loan changes and gross loan can not fully explain the discretionary 
portion of loan loss provisions. In order to improve this aspect, besides non-performing 
loan, total assets and loan loss reserves, I add another six loan categories as determinants 
of loan loss provisions: loan secured by real estates (LOANR), commercial and industrial 
loans (LOANC), loans to depository institutions (LOAND), loans to agricultural 
production (LOANA), individual loans (LOANI) and loans to foreign government 
(LOANF). All these variables are scaled by total loans.  This complete set of loan 
variables fairly control the credit risk, region effect, specific loan function and loan 
portfolio valuations related to nondiscretionary loan loss provisions. Thus the 
measurement error caused by missing variable is less a problem than Kim and Kross 
(1998) and Ahmed et al. (1999).   
          

























    TLLP        =   
 
NPL∆      = 
   
    LASSET   =   
    L L R    =   
     
 
Total loan loss provision as a percentage of the average 
of beginning and ending total loans; 
Change in nonperforming loans deflated by the average 
of beginning and ending total loans; 
Natural log of total asset; 












My results are not affected by the choice of total loan loss provisions as the 
dependent variable. As shown in Table 6.1, coefficient of TIC is significantly positive 
(0.0005, two tailed p-value of 0.00) and coefficient of T2C is significantly negative (-
0.0002, two tailed p-value of 0.00). The results are consistent with my hypotheses that 
banks with low Tier I capital would decrease loan loss provisions to reach the capital 
regulatory requirements. In contrast, banks would increase loan loss provisions to boost 
up Tier II capital when it is necessary. The conflicts between Tier II capital and earnings 
are also examined. The interaction term T2C* DECRE is significantly positive (0.6721, 
two tailed p-value of 0.01). This suggests that among banks with the same level of Tier II 
capital, banks with earnings decrease from the previous year would choose to decrease 
loan loss provisions for earnings management purpose. The above results are consistent 
with the results in chapter 5. Thus my main findings are not sensitive to the choice of 
dependent variables. 
Moreover, as an indicator of the goodness-of-fit of my model, the adjusted R-square 
(38.20%) is much higher than the adjusted R-square (20-24%) in Ahmed et al. (1999) 
model. This means that the variables in my regression have better explanatory power to 
loan loss provisions. Among the six loan categories added to my model as the 
determinants of nondiscretionary loan loss provisions, loans secured by real estates 
LOANR   =   
LOANC     =   
LOAND   =   
LOANA    =   
 
LOANI    =   
LOANF    =   
Loans secured by real estate deflated by total loans; 
Commercial and industrial loans deflated by total loans; 
Loans to depository institutions deflated by total loans; 
Loans to finance agricultural production deflated by total 
loans; 
Loans to individuals deflated by total loans; 
Loans to foreign government deflated by total loans; 
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(LOANR with a coefficient of 0.0047, two tailed p-value of 0.02), loans to commercial 
and industries (LOANC with a coefficient of 0.0098, two tailed p-value of 0.00), and 
loans to individuals (LOANI with a coefficient of 0.0205, two tailed p-value of 0.00) all 
have significant explanatory power. This result reminds researchers to take LOANR, 
LOANC and LOANI into consideration in their tests of capital managements via loan 
loss provisions in order to have a relatively complete control of the nondiscretionary 
portion of loan loss provisions. 
<– Insert Table 6.1 around here –> 
Neither Kim and Kross (1998) nor Ahmed et al. (1999) study the cross-sectional 
variations of capital management mechanisms across banks of different firm-specific 
characteristics. For the robustness check, I also examine the capital management 
variations with total loan loss provisions as the dependent variable in the regressions. 
Results in table 6.2 to table 6.6 are consistent with my hypotheses. As shown in these 
tables, banks purchased large amount of nonaudit services and small banks have stronger 
association between regulatory capital and total loan loss provisions, suggesting that 
these banks are more likely to be involved in capital management actions. In contrast, the 
capital management incentives of banks with low variability of nonaudit service purchase 
are suppressed. This is implied by the negative coefficient of TIC*VAR and positive 
coefficient of T2C*VAR in table 6.5. These two coefficients are both statistically 
significant, and their signs are opposite to coefficients of TIC and T2C respectively. I 
also examine the interactive effect between the magnitude and purchase frequency of 
nonaudit services. Same as what has been found in chapter five when discretionary loan 
loss provisions are used as the dependent variable, among banks with the same level of 
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nonaudit service purchase variety, the magnitude of nonaudit service fee ratios dominates 
capital management incentives. That is, banks with high level of nonaudit service fee 
ratios are likely to decrease loan loss provisions to boost up Tier I capital (coefficient of 
TIC*VAR*HNAF is 0.0005, with two tailed p-value of 0.00), and increase loan loss 
provisions if they consider Tier II capital management is necessary (coefficient of 
T2C*VAR*HNAF is -0.0007, with two tailed p-value of 0.00). 
In sum, the robustness tests of capital management mechanisms and their cross-
sectional variations show that my results are not sensitive to the choice of dependent 
variables.  
<– Insert Table 6.2- 6.6 around here –> 
 
6.2. Regulatory capital requirements and FDIC 
In this section, I demonstrate that my results in chapter 5 are applicable to both 
insured and uninsured banks. The new FDIC risk-based deposit insurance system 
incorporates capital adequacy requirements into its framework. Banks have to reach 
minimum capital adequacy level in order to benefit from deposit insurance in FDIC, 
which give banks capital management incentives.  
Both FDIC deposit insurance scheme and capital adequacy system are major 
mechanisms used by regulatory authorities to uphold the stability and healthiness of 
financial institutions. Capital adequacy requirements alone can not guarantee the 
financial soundness of a bank. Inadequate internal control systems or inappropriate 
foreign exchange trading and other types of financial instruments could lead to large 
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losses in banks even if the banks are adequately-capitalized or well-capitalized. Therefore 
banks need protections from federal deposit insurance. 
However, deposit insurance induces managerial incentives which are in conflict with 
incentives caused by capital adequacy policies. In the presence of limited liabilities 
generated from deposit insurance protections, an insured bank may follow an 
overinvestment policy and take excessive risk. In contrast to that, a bank may reduce its 
credit offer to reach capital adequacy requirements, which gives rise to an unproductive 
underinvestment problem as a result. This underinvestment and overinvestment problems, 
by nature, are derived from the interest conflicts between equity holders and depositors. 
Capital adequacy requirements provide assurance to depositors and other creditors. In the 
event of a winding-up, depositors suffer from losses only when the bank losses are in 
excess of its capital amount. Capital adequacy requirements help to reserve capital and 
protect depositors. On the contrary, equity holders typically benefit more from deposit 
insurance. High returns from risky projects mostly accrue to equity holders instead of 
depositors.  
The new FDIC risk-based deposit insurance scheme solves the interest conflicts 
between depositors and equity holders by incorporating capital adequacy requirements 
into its framework. Banks have to reach certain minimum capital adequacy requirements 
to be eligible to benefit from deposit insurance. Within the FDIC risk-based deposit 
insurance system, banks are classified into groups based on their risk-based capital ratios: 
 Well capitalized: 10% or higher 
 Adequately capitalized: 8% or higher 
 Undercapitalized: less than 8% 
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In order to benefit from the FDIC insurance protection, a bank must have its total capital 
adequacy ratio to be at least 8%; otherwise, FDIC may issue a warning to this 
undercapitalized bank and terminate its federal insurance.  
These capital requirements under the federal insurance scheme are perfectly matched 
with the capital adequacy regulations under the Basel Accord, which effectively aligns 
the interests of equity holders and depositors. If the capital requirements in the FDIC 
scheme are lower than those under the Basel Accord, an insured bank would choose to 
spend the capitals in excess of the FDIC capital requirements on highly risky projects to 
maximize shareholders’ value at the expense of the insurer. On the other hand, if the 
capital requirements in the FDIC scheme are higher than those under the Basel Accord, a 
bank does not prefer to be insured due to high capital cost. As a result, its default 
probability increases and consequently the stability of the whole financial system may 
deteriorate.  
In conclusion, the alignment of capital adequacy requirements under both the FDIC 
insurance scheme and the Basel Accord triggers banks’ capital management incentives, 
thus the results in this study are applicable to both insured and uninsured banks. 
Uninsured banks would like to reach capital adequacy requirement to be eligible for the 
FDIC insurance protection, and insured banks have to maintain their capital level to avoid 






6.3. Adequately-capitalized banks and well-capitalized banks 
 I further examine whether “adequately-capitalized” banks still have strong capital 
manipulation incentives to meet higher capital adequacy threshold of being “well-
capitalized” in this section. 
According the US Federal Reserve Board (FRB), to be adequately capitalized under 
federal bank regulatory agency definitions, a bank holding company must have Tier I 
capital ratio of at least 4%, and total capital ratio (a combined Tier I and Tier II capital 
ratio) of at least 8%. In order to be well-capitalized, a bank holding company needs to 
reach much higher capital adequacy requirements: Tier I capital ratio has to be at least 
6% and total capital ratio exceeds 10%.  
Within the FDIC federal insurance scheme, “well-capitalized” banks of total capital 
ratios above 10% could have significantly incremental benefits. According to the Prompt 
Corrective Action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA), in addition to enjoy federal deposit insurance protection, a well-
capitalized bank can also have the ability to use brokered deposits under the FDICIA and 
become eligible to be a financial services holding company. In addition, well-capitalized 
commercial banks are allowed to engage in consolidation activities with investment 
banks under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act20 (GLBA). Having both saving accounts and 
investment accounts in the same time assures banks to do well in all economic times. 
They can benefit from saving accounts when economy is not good, and make profit from 
investment accounts when economy turns to grow fast. Being well-capitalized also helps 
                                                 




banks’ “CAMELS” rating 21 . However, all those additional benefits of being well-
capitalized come at high prices. First, capital cost is very high in recent years. Second, 
and most importantly, reduction in leverage diminishes the bank’s expected returns and 
thus shareholders’ value is affected (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 
1988; Rochet, 1992).  
Take the benefits and costs of being “well-capitalized” into consideration, I suspect 
that adequately-capitalized banks with total capital ratios close to “well-capitalized” 
requirement would have strong incentive to reach the higher 10% FDIC threshold. I 
tested this hypothesis by including new variables into the basic model in formula (1), 
T1C*CLOSE1 and T2C*CLOSE2. CLOSE1 is a dummy variable, equals to 1 if the Tier 
I capital is between 5.5% and 6%.  CLOSE2 is a dummy variable, equals to 1 if the total 
capital of a bank is between 9.5% and 10%. The untabulated results show that the 
coefficients of both T1C*CLOSE1 and T2C*CLOSE2 are not significant. As mentioned 
earlier, high capital cost and reduction in expected return in capital may restrain banks 
from being “well-capitalized”. I re-defined CLOSE1 variable to four different closeness 
intervals, 5.6%-6%, 5.7%-6%, 5.8%-6% and 5.9%-6%, and CLOSE2 variable to four 
different closeness intervals, 9.6%-10%, 9.7%-10%, 9.8%-10% and 9.9%-10%. I 
replicated my tests based on these new closeness measures. My results do not suggest 
that “adequately-capitalized” banks that meet the Basel requirement are compelled to 
manage loan loss provisions to meet the higher threshold in FDIC to be “well-
capitalized”. 
 
                                                 
21  CAMELS is an international bank-rating system. "CAMELS" represents the six factors that bank 
supervisory authorities would consider to decide a bank‘s rating: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 




Sensitivity test of Capital Management Hypothesis 
(Dependent Variable= LLP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0142 0.00 
TIC 0.0005 0.00 
T2C -0.0002 0.00 
T2C* DECRE 0.6721 0.01 
LLR -0.0098 0.00 
EBTP 0.0003 0.02 
DECRE -0.0001 0.61 
BIGFIVE -0.0007 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.83 
 
 0.1002 0.00 
LASSET 0.0003 0.00 
LLR 0.3642 0.00 
LOANR 0.0047 0.02 
LOANC  0.0098 0.00 
LOAND 0.0048 0.56 
LOANA 0.0052 0.18 
LOANI 0.0205 0.00 
LOANF 0.1237 0.24 
   
R-square 38.85%  
Adjusted R-square 38.20%  

























Loan loss provision deflated by the average loans  
Ratio of Tier I capital before loan loss reserves to the risk-
weighted total assets 
Ratio of Tier II capital before reserves to the risk-weighted total 
assets 
Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves before loan loss provisions to the 
risk-weighted total assets  
Dummy variable, equals to one if there is earnings decrease from 
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Earnings before taxes and loan loss provision deflated by the 
average total assets 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 if the sample firm is audited by 
Arthur Andersen (AA),  Deloitee & Touché (D&T), Ernst & 
Young (E&Y), KPMG (KPMG), or PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC). 
Ratio of total liability to average total assets 
Non-audit service fee to total fee ratio, non-audit service fee is 
the sum of audit-related fee, tax fees, other advisory fees, IS 
and all other fees  
Change in nonperforming loans deflated by the average of 
beginning and ending total loans 
Natural log of total asset 
Loan loss reserve deflated by the total loans at the beginning 
of the year 
Loans secured by real estate as a percentage of total loans 
Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to depository institutions as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to finance agricultural production as a percentage of 
total loans 
Loans to individuals as a percentage of total loans 
Loans to foreign government as a percentage of total loans 
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TABLE 6.2 
Sensitivity Test of HNAF impact on Capital Management Mechanisms 




Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0142 0.00 
TIC 0.0003 0.01 
T2C -0.0001 0.01 
T2C* DECRE 0.6735 0.01 
LLR -0.0135 0.01 
EBTP 0.0000 0.89 
DECRE -0.0003 0.30 
TIC*HNAF 0.0002 0.00 
T2C*HNAF -0.0004 0.00 
LLR*HNAF 0.0047 0.41 
EBTP*HNAF 0.0003 0.21 
DECRE*HNAF 0.0004 0.29 
BIGFIVE -0.0007 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.83 
 
 0.0964 0.00 
LASSET 0.0004 0.00 
LLR 0.3639 0.00 
LOANR 0.0046 0.02 
LOANC  0.0096 0.00 
LOAND 0.0037 0.65 
LOANA 0.0045 0.25 
LOANI 0.0199 0.00 
LOANF 0.1332 0.20 
   
R-square 39.57%  





Sensitivity Test of VAR impact on Capital Management Mechanisms  

















(Constant) -0.0135 0.00  -0.0135 0.00 
TIC 0.0004 0.00  0.0004 0.00 
T2C -0.0007 0.00  -0.0011 0.00 
T2C*DECRE 0.6568 0.01  0.6818 0.01 
LLR -0.0086 0.00  -0.0070 0.04 
EBTP 0.0006 0.00  0.0008 0.00 
DECRE 0.0001 0.84  0.0000 0.99 
TIC*VAR -0.0002 0.02  0.0000 0.00 
T2C*VAR 0.0006 0.00  0.0001 0.00 
LLR*VAR -0.0058 0.30  -0.0010 0.21 
EBTP*VAR -0.0007 0.00  -0.0001 0.01 
DECRE*VAR -0.0003 0.50  -0.0002 0.64 
BIGFIVE -0.0008 0.00  -0.0008 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.80  0.0000 0.75 
 
 0.0939 0.00  0.0904 0.00 NPL∆
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LASSET 0.0004 0.00  0.0004 0.00 
LLR 0.3656 0.00  0.3662 0.00 
LOANR 0.0042 0.03  0.0043 0.03 
LOANC  0.0094 0.00  0.0094 0.00 
LOAND 0.0044 0.58  0.0043 0.59 
LOANA 0.0034 0.38  0.0033 0.39 
LOANI 0.0201 0.00  0.0200 0.00 
LOANF 0.1432 0.17  0.1217 0.24 
      
R-square 40.05%   40.48%  
Adjusted R-square 39.22%   39.65%  










Sensitivity test of Size Effect on Banks’ Capital Management Mechanisms 




Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0124 0.00 
TIC 0.0000 0.77 
T2C 0.0000 0.91 
T2C*DECRE 0.6247 0.02 
LLR -0.0083 0.01 
EBTP 0.0004 0.01 
DECRE 0.0001 0.78 
TIC*SIZE 0.0005 0.00 
T2C*SIZE -0.0012 0.00 
LLR*SIZE -0.0053 0.29 
EBTP*SIZE -0.0004 0.11 
DECRE*SIZE -0.0002 0.63 
BIGFIVE -0.0006 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.86 
 
 0.0994 0.00 
LASSET 0.0002 0.01 
LLR 0.3672 0.00 
LOANR 0.0052 0.01 
LOANC  0.0099 0.00 
LOAND 0.0093 0.25 
LOANA 0.0056 0.14 
LOANI 0.0211 0.00 
LOANF 0.1198 0.25 
   
R-square 41.40%  
Adjusted R-square 40.59%  






Sensitivity Test of the Interaction between HNAF and VAR on Banks’ Manipulation 
Incentives (Dependent Variable= LLP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0137 0.00 
TIC 0.0002 0.03 
T2C -0.0008 0.00 
T2C*DECRE 0.6993 0.01 
LLR -0.0087 0.00 
EBTP 0.0005 0.00 
DECRE 0.0001 0.84 
TIC*VAR -0.0003 0.00 
T2C*VAR 0.0008 0.00 
LLR*VAR 0.0000 1.00 
EBTP*VAR -0.0006 0.04 
DECRE*VAR -0.0003 0.47 
TIC*VAR*HNAF 0.0005 0.00 
T2C*VAR*HNAF -0.0007 0.00 
LLR*VAR*HNAF -0.0583 0.00 
EBTP*VAR*HNAF -0.0003 0.38 
DECRE*VAR*HNAF 0.0003 0.60 
BIGFIVE -0.0008 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.90 
 
 0.0908 0.00 
LASSET 0.0004 0.00 
LLR 0.3667 0.00 
LOANR 0.0044 0.02 
LOANC  0.0097 0.00 
LOAND 0.0057 0.48 
LOANA 0.0035 0.36 
LOANI 0.0204 0.00 
LOANF 0.1301 0.21 
   
R-square 41.18%  
Adjusted R-square 40.17%  





Sensitivity Test of the Interaction between HNAF and SIZE on Banks’ Manipulation 
Incentives (Dependent variable= LLP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Estimates Two Tailed p-value 
(Constant) -0.0129 0.00 
TIC 0.0003 0.01 
T2C -0.0001 0.03 
T2C*DECRE 0.5855 0.03 
LLR -0.0138 0.01 
EBTP 0.0000 0.88 
DECRE -0.0003 0.28 
TIC*HNAF 0.0002 0.04 
T2C*HNAF -0.0003 0.07 
LLR*HNAF 0.0071 0.22 
EBTP*HNAF 0.0004 0.11 
DECRE*HNAF 0.0009 0.09 
TIC*HNAF*SIZE 0.0001 0.25 
T2C*HNAF*SIZE -0.0006 0.03 
LLR*HNAF*SIZE -0.0118 0.11 
EBTP*HNAF*SIZE -0.0004 0.14 
DECRE*HNAF*SIZE -0.0008 0.21 
BIGFIVE -0.0007 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.0000 0.97 
 
 0.0990 0.00 
LASSET 0.0003 0.00 
LLR 0.3631 0.00 
LOANR 0.0046 0.02 
LOANC  0.0096 0.00 
LOAND 0.0046 0.57 
LOANA 0.0048 0.21 
LOANI 0.0201 0.00 
LOANF 0.1485 0.15 
   
R-square 40.07%  










  This thesis empirically investigates the U.S banks’ capital management mechanisms 
under the Basel Accord. To provide deeper and more specific evidences on bank managers’ 
responses to new capital requirements, this thesis also examines the cross-sectional variations 
of capital management mechanisms across banks of different firm-specific characteristics. 
Specifically, three firm-specific characteristic factors are considered in this study- bank size, 
magnitude and variability of nonaudit service fees.  
Two types of regulatory capital - Tier I capital and Tier II capital, are examined together 
for the first time in this thesis. It is important to note that under the Basel Accord, in addition 
to Tier I capital, Tier II capital also has substantial impact on capital management incentives 
Moreover, the capital management mechanisms of Tier I capital and Tier II capital are 
extraordinarily different. However, this dichotomy is completely missed in the literature.  
The capital managements of Tier I capital and Tier II capital via loan loss provisions are 
both examined in this thesis. The results reveal that, specifically: (I) Tier I capital is 
positively related to loan loss provisions. This finding is different from literature results. Prior 
papers document negative association between primary capital and loan loss provisions. 
Because loan loss reserves are removed from Tier I capital under the Basel Accord, and the 
net effect of loan loss provisions on Tier I capital becomes negative. Thus banks would like 
to manipulate Tier I capital r upward by decreasing loan loss provisions, instead of increasing 
as they did prior to the Basel Accord. (II) In contrast to Tier I capital management 
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mechanism, Tier II capital is negatively associated with loan loss provisions. This suggests 
that banks would choose to increase loan loss provisions to inflate Tier II capital. (III) 
Because the loan loss reserves includable in Tier II capital are limited to an upper bound, 
banks with less loan loss reserves generally have higher Tier II capital manipulation 
incentives. (IV) Loan loss provisions have conflicting impact on Tier II capital and earnings 
which is caused by the new capital requirement changes under the Basel Accord. I find out 
that, among banks with the same level of Tier II capital, banks with earnings decrease from 
the prior year would choose to decrease loan loss provisions for earnings management 
purpose, instead of increasing loan loss provisions to boost up Tier II capital. Moreover, 
unlike the contradictory effects related to Tier II capital and earnings, manipulation 
incentives of Tier I capital and earnings become consistent under the Basel Accord. Banks 
are able to increase Tier I capital and earnings at the same time via loan loss provision 
reduction. Regulators need to pay more attention to this new relationship. The alignment 
between Tier I capital and earnings may encourage banks to involve in capital management 
or earnings management actions or both.  Bank managers can now manage to increase either 
capital or earnings without worrying about the decrease of the other as they did prior to the 
Basel Accord. 
Extending the research scope of prior capital management studies, this thesis further 
analyzes the cross-sectional variations of the above identified capital manipulation 
mechanisms as a function of three firm-specific characteristics factors. It is for the first time 
in literature that this paper answers the research question how capital manipulation 
mechanisms change dynamically across different banks. My results show that: (I) in 
comparison with large banks, capital managements via loan loss provisions prevail in small 
banks. (II) Consistent with evidence from non-banking industries, high level of nonaudit 
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services purchased from incumbent auditors strengthen the association between bank capital 
and loan loss provisions. In other words, banks that purchase nonaudit services in large 
amount are more likely to engage in capital management behaviors. (III) In contrast, nonaudit 
service purchases of low variability weaken the tie between loan loss provisions and 
regulatory capital, suggesting that regular and consistent nonaudit service purchases suppress 
banks’ discretionary incentives.  (IV) This thesis also examines the impact of the interaction 
between nonaudit service fee magnitude and purchase frequency. My results indicate that 
nonaudit service fee magnitude plays a dominant role when banks’ nonaudit service purchase 
frequencies are the same. Among banks with the same nonaudit service purchase pattern, 
banks with high level of nonaudit service fees are more likely to participate in capital 
management actions.  
The capital manipulation mechanisms and their cross-sectional variations identified in 
this thesis paper uncover “crimes” possibly conducted by bank managers in response to 
regulatory changes of the Basel Accord. Based on the results, I can suggest governance 
practitioners and academics to take a more circumspect regulatory policy approach to detect 
manipulative behaviors, and take appropriate “punishment” to fit “the crime”. Furthermore, 
my findings can provide valuable reference to regulatory institutions and researchers even if 
the Basel II is implemented in the United States22. Basel II aims to improve the internal risk 
measurement system by providing a more forward-looking approach, however, the regulatory 
capital compositions and calculation methods are left unchanged. My findings might also be 
of interest to auditors. Audit risk and related legal liabilities can be affected by regulatory 
changes. Understanding banks’ capital management incentives and mechanisms can help 
auditors to lower unnecessary audit risk exposure. 
                                                 
22 The United States is still having the national regulator implementation of the Basel Accord, but not Basel II. 
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There are several limitations and caveats to this study. First, although this thesis examines 
nonaudit service as one firm-specific characteristic factor when investigating the cross-
sectional variations of capital management mechanisms, it does not discuss whether auditor 
independence is truly impaired or not. This stand-alone marginal analysis can not tell much 
about that due to the unobservability of auditor independence. Advanced and rigorous models 
which can probe subjective issues are needed. Thus this study only uncovers the impact of 
nonaudit services on the association between banks’ regulatory capital and loan loss 
provisions. Second, the impact of nonaudit service purchase variability on capital 
management should be considered in light of my sample selection process. It is possible that 
purchasing nonaudit services in a consistent and regular manner suppresses banks’ 
managerial actions only for the sample period 2000-2005 when nonaudit services attract the 
highest regulatory attention ever. Third, limited sample size and time period prohibit the 
results to be generalized to other samples and other time periods. However, the limitation in 
sample period is necessary because the nonaudit service fee data becomes available only 
starting from year 2000. Finally, my evidence of capital management mechanisms are 
industry-specific, which have difficulties to be generalized to other non-banking industries.  
Going forward, I expect that bank capital managements via loan loss provisions will 
continue to be the main object of interest in accounting research. There has been recently 
intense discussion on Basel II which aims to better align bank capital with actual risks facing 
by banks. In addition to the Basel II amendment that incorporated market risks in 1996, Basel 
committee issued an agreed text and a comprehensive version of Basel II Framework in June 
2004 and July 2006 respectively. It is quite evident that this Basel II will not have much 
relevance if the bank capital quality is not satisfactory. This thesis uncovers the dynamics 
how bank capital quality is deteriorated by managerial actions and how it is changed across 
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different banks. Therefore, despite the limitations, the evidence of capital management 
mechanisms and their cross-sectional variations identified in this study have very important 
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 Loan Loss Provisioning Reference Percentage within Each Loan Classification 
 
The percentage reference system only works as a guideline. Take the provisioning percentage 
for doubtful loan for example. Within the system regulated by Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA), the percentage of loan loss provisions for doubtful loan could be 
anywhere within the range of 50-75%,  or 75-100% if the loan is classified as doubtful for 
more than  6 months. The provisioning may range from 40% to 60% of the doubtful loan 
value under the provisioning reference system in mainland china. That is, even if managers 
consent to classify a loan as a doubtful loan, the real provisioning difference could be as big 
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“Reference percentages” to each grade 
 





























According to special risk characteristics such as 
country risk and industry sector risk as assessed by 
the banks 
 
* Includes customer loans and loans to financial institutions 
 
 
      Note:  
1.  General provisions: It is also known as collective provision. Focus is on the incurred 
losses   that cannot yet be ascribed to individual loans. UK Statement of Recommended 
Accounting Practices (SORP): “…portfolios of advances often contain advances which 
are in fact impaired at the balance sheet date, but which will not be specifically 
identified until some time in the future…To cover the impaired advances which will 
only be identified as such in the future, a general provision should be made”  
 
2. Specific provisions: Focus is on the procedure to arrive at a net book value of 
individual loans to establish specific allowances to cover ascertained and estimated 
losses in those loans on an item-by-item basis. UK Statement of Recommended 
Accounting Practices (SORP): “A loan is impaired when, based upon current 
information and events, the bank considers that the creditworthiness of the borrower 
has undergone deterioration such that it no longer expects to recover the advance in 
full” 
  
3. The above data are from KPMG Regulatoryalert, Issue 3 June 2002. 
